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Why “*Tolle Lege*”?

The title of this journal is a reference to an extraordinary moment of conversion in the life of St. Augustine, the great philosopher and theologian of the early medieval period. The story begins with St. Augustine sitting beneath a fig tree, weeping in distress over his inability to leave behind his life of sin and follow God faithfully. Amidst his tears he hears the distant voice of a child chanting the words “*Tolle, lege!*” or “Take up and read!” Aroused from his pitiable state and taking this as a sign from God, he goes to his house, picks up the first book he finds, and reads the first chapter. The book contained the letters of St. Paul, and the verse that Augustine read spoke to his heart with such force that he was convinced beyond any doubt of the truth of God; he was converted on the spot.

This journal of philosophy and theology is meant to embody a spirit of truth-seeking—on the part of both the contributors and you, the reader. Like St. Augustine, we are all faced with the choice between complacency and continual conversion toward truth. We hope that this journal will serve as an aid in the discovery of truth, and thus we exhort you in all earnestness to “take up and read!”

Editors' Note

By now it is safe to say that the Mount's journal of philosophy and theology is here to stay. For a third year in a row, a group of undergraduate students shed intellectual and spiritual blood, sweat, and tears to compile essays written by and for members of the Mount community.

Tolle Lege is an undergraduate journal. Undergraduate students, with the help of faculty advisors, carry out all the editorial tasks of soliciting, selecting, and preparing essays for publication. Submissions, on the other hand, are accepted from undergraduate, graduate, and seminary students alike. They are evaluated through a blind review process, in which their scholarly value and interest level are considered. This year's essays, chosen for their excellent integration of philosophy and theology and the quality of their research, are particularly exciting. Topics range from a historical-theological analysis of *Galatians* and *Corinthians* to a philosophical argument grounded in modern psychological research.

Every year we are astounded and pleased by the number of well-written and well-argued papers that we receive, and this year was no different. Micaela Harrison's essay "The Role of Fairy Tales in Developing the Moral Character of Children" received our annual prize for the best essay submitted, with editors citing the originality of its subject-matter and its stylistic excellence.

We would like to extend a heartfelt thanks to the many students who submitted essays for consideration, and we congratulate those whose essays were selected for publication. Special thanks go to Ms. Erin Reilly of the Mount's Communications office, who lent her considerable expertise in the layout and design of the present issue. Finally, we are grateful to the vice president of Academic Affairs Dr. David Rehm, the dean of the College of Liberal Arts Dr. Joshua Hochschild, the chair of the Theology Department Fr. James Donohue, and the chair of the Philosophy Department Dr. Richard Buck for their financial support, without which this journal would not exist.

Kayla Garry and Siobhan Riley
Co-Editors-in-Chief
December 2009

The Role of Fairy Tales in Developing the Moral Character of Children

Micaela Harrison

Micaela Harrison was born and raised in Red Bank, New Jersey. After graduating in 2010 with a major in philosophy and a minor in legal studies, she plans to attend law school. In the future, she hopes to pursue a career in the field of human rights.

Becoming a responsible, morally developed human person does not happen overnight; children need guidance and moral examples to learn from and follow. Fairy tales are generally among the first stories that children encounter in life, and they are deeply significant for moral formation. These stories have an impact on young children not only by stirring their imagination, but also by laying the foundation for morality in their lives. A child's favorite bedtime story is also responsible for educating and developing their moral character. Through legendary characters and magical events, fairy tales awaken the moral imagination of children and portray the importance and benefits of living the good life. These stories, with their lessons of virtue and ethics, influence children in the development of their moral character.

The characters depicted in fairy tales offer examples of displaying either virtue or vice, and the consequences that come from each. Almost all popular fairy tales have a villain, a wicked stepmother, or some other representation of an immoral person. When faced with a moral dilemma, these particular characters often choose the seemingly "wrong" or "bad" path to pursue, and yet they are often portrayed as getting what they want. However, while their unethical actions may lead to the immediate satisfaction of their desires, it does not lead them to the good life. These characters are usually portrayed as receiving punishment somewhere along the line for their unethical way of life. Wicked characters in fairy tales represent the negative consequences of acting without virtue, which is a lesson that is important to the moral development of children.

The consequences that are ultimately faced by the villains in fairy tales provide children with a motivation to act ethically in the context of their own lives. These wicked characters face a situation in the story that a child may not have experienced themselves. However, reading a fairy tale, and the account of the downfall of those immoral characters, is a way for children to experience a situation that they may or may not encounter in their day to day life. Fairy tales can be used as a means to expose children to the consequences of acting without virtue.

The heroes, princesses, or other forms of moral exemplars found in fairy tales are portrayed as those that live the good life. Although it is these characters in the story that are often shown to live through hardships and face many obstacles, they continue to maintain their morality in the face of adversity. These characters are typically portrayed as remaining virtuous despite their many struggles, temptations, and occasional failures, and wind up reaping the rewards by one day “living happily ever after.” It is the example set by these ethical characters by which children learn of virtues and morality. When faced with a moral dilemma, these particular characters maintain their moral standards, even though this may have been the harder direction in which to go. It is their commitment to morality which ultimately leads them to the good life, or in fairy tale language, “happily ever after.” The virtuous characters reap the benefits for maintaining their moral standards in the face of obstacles and hardships. These characters play a crucial role in developing the moral character of children not only because they embody morals and virtues, but also because morality must also be tested and shown to be the right way of living.

Fairy tales were brought into the nursery during the Victorian era of England because people believed they were capable of educating the moral imagination in children. While much of England seemed to support the use of fairy tales during the time, it did not occur without hostility and criticism within the literary world. Matthew Grenby, a professor of children’s literature at the University of Newcastle, attributes the criticism of fairy tales to a struggle between fantasy and reason. He characterizes children’s literature during the Victorian era as “a struggle between ‘imaginative’ writing, represented by the fairy tale, and more didactically driven, ‘rational’

literature.”¹ It was argued that fairy tales filled the minds of children with “fantastic visions, instead of useful knowledge.”² Despite the many criticisms, there were still people who defended fairy tales and contended that they were indeed beneficial to the moral development of children. In response to the criticism, some authors even made notes at the beginning of their books to inform readers that their tales were far from pure fantasy, and were intended to portray the value of the moral life.³

In modern times, there has been a resurgence of the popularity of fairy tales. Bruno Bettelheim, a renowned psychiatrist, stimulated this movement a little over thirty years ago with his publication of *The Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales*. He claims that fairy tales have regained their importance in modern times to respond to the growing individualistic and independent nature of children, and overall society. Bettelheim explains that by hearing about serious problems, children are given crucial information for the planning of their lives and the way they should act in certain situations. From the characters portrayed in fairy tales, children learn that the difficulties of life are universal and can be overcome by perseverance, and more importantly, they become aware that there is a way for them to develop into good people. According to Bettelheim, children need “a moral education that teaches not through abstract ethical concepts but through that which seems tangibly right and therefore meaningful. . . . The child finds this kind of meaning through fairy tales.”⁴

Fairy tales, according to Bettelheim, squarely confront children with situations that are, to them, the scariest things that could happen: such as death, aging, loss of a parent, being trapped or lost, and so on. Modern adaptations of fairy tales are known to simplify the situation, which allows the child to understand the problem in its most essential form. The characters are clearly drawn out and useless details are eliminated. Evil is as common as any virtue and both are usually embodied in the form of a figure or their actions. Evil, however, is not without its attractions, “symbolized by the mighty dragon or giant, the power of the witch, the cunning

¹ M. O. Grenby, “Tame Fairies Make Good Teachers: The Popularity of Early Fairy Tales,” *The Lion and Unicorn* 30 (2006): 2.

² *Ibid.*, 7.

³ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁴ Bruno Bettelheim, *The Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales* (New York: Knopf Publishing, 1989), 5.

queen in ‘Snow White.’”⁵ In many fairy tales, the wicked character succeeds for a given time, as can be seen with Cinderella’s stepmother and stepsisters. The short-lived success of these characters is important because it shows that acting without virtue will not automatically bring about negative consequences. In the end, however, the wicked character is punished for acting without virtue, and the moral lesson is presented in which crime does not pay. The eventual downfall of these characters shows children that everyone will eventually have to face the consequences of their actions, even if it is not right away. Because children follow the character of the hero through his or her journey, they can identify with all of the hero’s struggles and triumphs. As a result, the child “makes such identifications all on his own, and the inner and outer struggles of the hero imprint morality on him.”⁶

The most important element for the moral development of children found in fairy tales is the moral dilemma that is presented to the hero. Through this representation, children learn that choices have consequences, and this results in the awareness that children can choose what kind of people they want to be. Although the child is not granted independence in the sense of freedom and power, he or she is granted responsibility for his or her own moral development, which is a form of independence. From fairy tales, children learn to consider *why* they do anything, and also to think about whether their motive behind an action is right or wrong. These stories bring forth the realization of self-creation: “through moral choices, he creates himself.”⁷ Through the portrayal of the character of the hero, and how this character maintains moral standing in spite of many struggles endured and obstacles overcome, children learn the benefits of remaining virtuous and apprehend the importance of a continued commitment to morality.

The struggles and hardships faced by the character of the hero in fairy tales present children with a realistic dilemma that they may one day face: it is not always easy to act ethically, and throughout life, one’s morality and virtue is tested. Only by “going out into the world” and “making the right decisions” does the hero learn the lessons of the good life, and eventually leads to living

⁵ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁶ Joe Winston, “Careful the Tale You Tell: Fairy Tales, Drama, and Moral Education,” *Children & Society* 9 (2007): 88.

⁷ Sheldon Cashdan, *The Witch Must Die: The Hidden Meanings of Fairy Tales* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 11.

“happily ever after.” In this sense, fairy tales can be viewed as being “future-oriented, which serve as a guide for children that present models for behavior, and ultimately provides meaning and value to their lives.”⁸ Rather than influencing children to escape into a world of fantasy, which has been the dominant criticism of fairy tales throughout history, these stories give children the tools to aid in the development of moral character, as well as to help develop courage to face whatever the world may present to them. In most fairy tales, the character of the hero is often depicted as being lost, alone, and frightened; all of which are feelings that a child can identify with; childhood is a vulnerable time of life. And yet, the hero is guided and given help along the way, even during the toughest of times, because this character is determined to remain virtuous and is courageous when the moral decision is not the easiest one to make.

Fairy tales, unlike any other form of literature, direct the child to discover his identity and calling, and they also suggest what experiences are needed to develop his character further. Fairy tales imitate that a rewarding, good life is within one’s reach despite adversity—but only if one does not shy away from the hazardous struggles without which one can never achieve true identity.⁹

Fairy tales capture the meaning of morality through vivid depictions of the struggles between good and evil, in which characters must make difficult choices between right and wrong. These stories avoid didacticism, or the instructional quality of simply telling children what is right or wrong, and stir the imagination with important symbolism that is relevant to the shape of our world. The contemporary moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre sums up this point eloquently:

It is through hearing stories about wicked stepmothers, lost children, good but misguided kings, wolves that suckle twin boys, youngest sons who receive no inheritance but must make their own way in the world and eldest sons who waste their inheritance . . . that children learn or mislearn what a child and what a parent is, what the cast of characters may be in the drama into which they have been born and what the ways of the world are. Deprive children of stories and you leave them

⁸ Winston, “Careful the Tale You Tell,” 89.

⁹ Bettelheim, *The Uses of Enchantment*, 93.

unscripted, anxious stutterers in their actions as in their words.¹⁰

Fairy tales provide children with experiences they have never had, and offer a view of how the actions of one character affect not only the other characters, but also the outcome of the story. Without some kind of experience or exposure to the meaning of morality, children remain ignorant of the good life and do not recognize the significance between right and wrong. Fairy tales provide children with an understandable foundation of morality, as well as characters and situations that they can relate to the world they live in.

Developing moral character and living the good life is about being responsive and responsible toward other people. Virtues are those character traits that enable people to use their freedom in morally responsible ways, as well as help to determine the kind of person one wants to be. The simple ability to use moral principles to justify one's actions does not ensure a person as being a virtuous person. For example, the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber tells the story of how he made "the fatal mistake of giving instructions in ethics" by presenting ethics as formal rules and principles.¹¹ He soon discovered that very little of this kind of education is "transformed into character-building substance."¹² Buber's story reflects the notion that simple instruction of morality is not sufficient to nurture the virtues. Rather, a compelling vision of the goodness of goodness itself needs to be presented in a way that is attractive to the reader and stirs the imagination. The development of moral character must "address both the cognitive and affective dimensions of human nature."¹³ Fairy tales are an effective medium of this kind of moral education, one which involves and influences thinking and reasoning, as well as feelings and emotions.

The situations depicted in fairy tales offer children the opportunity to use their reasoning in ways they may not usually be able to in their everyday lives. While reading a fairy tale, children think about what they would do if they were placed in a similar situation. Additionally, children think about whether the actions of the characters were right or wrong, or if they should have done

¹⁰ Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 216.

¹¹ Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man* (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1978), 105.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Richard L. Upright, "To Tell a Tale: The Use of Moral Dilemmas to Increase Empathy in the Elementary School Child," *Early Childhood Education Journal* 30 (2002): 15.

something differently. Children become more concerned with the characters throughout the story and become attached to them in a significant way. Children become upset when they learn that the hero has to face a struggle that he or she does not deserve. Further, a child becomes frustrated when the villain gets away with doing something wrong and places another obstacle in front of the hero. The characters in fairy tales, as well as the situations they face, bring out the natural emotions that children feel towards them. These stories offer children an opportunity to experience these feelings and reason through a situation that they have not experienced in the context of their own lives. Fairy tales depict moral character and virtue in a way that is both attractive and understandable to children.

“Beauty and the Beast” is a fairy tale that is a favorite of many children, as well as adults, because it contrasts goodness and badness in a way that is appealing to the imagination. It is also a story that depicts the mystery of virtue itself; virtue is the “magic” of the moral life “for it often appears in the most unexpected persons and places with surprising results.”¹⁴ At the beginning of this fairy tale, readers are told that a very rich merchant had three daughters, all of whom “were extremely handsome, especially the youngest; [so she was called] ‘the little Beauty.’”¹⁵ There are no further descriptions offered of Beauty’s physical attributes. Instead, the story draws the attention of the reader to her virtuous character. Beauty’s moral character can be found in her “inner beauty,” which is contrasted with her sisters’ pride, vanity, and selfishness, or their “inner ugliness.” Although Beauty’s sisters were both very physically attractive, they “had a great deal of pride, because they were rich...and laughed at their sister.”¹⁶ In stark contrast, Beauty was “charming, sweet tempered . . . spoke kindly to poor people,” and truly loved her father.¹⁷

As a result of her moral character, Beauty is able to “see” the kindness and goodness in Beast that lies hidden beneath his monstrous appearance. At her first dinner in his castle, Beauty tells Beast that she will not lie to him, and admits that she finds him ugly. However, she reveals that she believes him to be “very good-

¹⁴ Alice Abler, “The Moral of the Story,” Vision Media, <http://www.vision.org/> (2006).

¹⁵ Iona Opie and Peter Opie, *The Classic Fairy Tales* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 182.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 183.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

natured.”¹⁸ Beauty’s admission represents the importance of truthfulness even when it is difficult. Although it would have been easier for her to not say anything at all, Beauty tells Beast the truth because it is the right thing to do. When Beast continues to make self-deprecatory remarks, Beauty responds empathetically: “Among mankind. . . There are many that deserve that name [Beast] more than you, and I prefer you, just as you are, to those, who, under a human form, hide a treacherous, corrupt, and ungrateful heart.”¹⁹ Beauty’s conversation with Beast presents children with the opportunity to understand the significance of the truth, even in a situation that makes truthfulness difficult.

The distinct contrast between Beauty’s goodness and her sisters’ badness, which is masked by their physical attractiveness, parallels the irony that Beast, who is physically repulsive, is good and virtuous. “Beauty and the Beast” teaches children the simple, but important, lesson that appearances can be deceptive; that what is seen is not always what it appears to be. “Moral states are manifested in the body . . . as fantasy acts as a means of expressing a moral lesson.”²⁰ Similarly, this fairy tale also invites the reader to imagine what the outcome may have been if Beauty’s sisters had been put in her position. Without question, they would not have recognized or appreciated the goodness beneath Beast’s monstrous appearance. It also seems unlikely that they would have made Beauty’s courageous choice to befriend him. The story portrays the paradoxical truth that unless a person has virtue, he or she will not be able to find, appreciate, and embrace virtue in another.

“Beauty and the Beast” portrays another important moral lesson: a person’s decisions in life will define what kind of person he or she becomes. It is through our own choices that we decide what kind of person we will become. At the end of this fairy tale, the “beautiful lady” who has visited Beauty in her dreams appears at Beast’s castle and brings Beauty’s entire family with her. The fairy then says to Beauty, “Come and see the reward of your judicious choice; you have preferred virtue before either wit or beauty, and deserve to have a person in whom these qualifications are united: you are going to be a great queen.”²¹ Beauty’s sisters, on the other

¹⁸ Ibid., 90.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Elaine Ostery, “Magical Growth and Moral Lessons,” *The Lion and the Unicorn* 27, (2003): 44.

²¹ Opie and Opie, *The Classic Fairy Tales*, 195.

hand, are unhappy in their marriages because they chose their spouses solely upon the basis of good looks and wit. Through greed, jealousy, and pride, the hearts of Beauty's sisters have become like stone. As a result, they are turned into statues, but retain their consciousness so that they can observe Beauty's happiness until they admit their own faults.

Similar to most great fairy tales, "Beauty and the Beast" provokes readers to draw analogies between the imaginary world it portrays and the world in which we live. These stories provide the imagination with all kinds of information, but it is not clearly apparent how the imagination is actually awakened and made moral. Awakening and nurturing the moral imagination is a difficult task, and mistakes in teaching ethics and developing moral character are not uncommon. Maria Tatar, the chairperson of the Program in Folklore and Mythology at Harvard University, explains that these kinds of mistakes are often committed today, especially when "the role of human conduct is overestimated and the roles of the will and the imagination are underestimated."²² Despite evidence that morality has failed to be transmitted to children effectively in certain contexts, ethics has persistently been taught as if it comes from a "how to" manual for successful living. Moral principles, and even the virtues themselves, have been routinely introduced to children as if they are practically instruments for achieving success. This is to say that moral principles have often been presented as mere rules to be followed, rather than being presented within a broader context that children can relate to and examine, such as the case with fairy tales. When children are told that the standards of social utility and material success are the measurements of the value of moral principles and virtues, then the result of transforming children's minds and converting their hearts is unlikely. In the simple portrayal of morality, without regard to nurturing the moral imagination, all that will be accomplished is "to confirm the despair of the weak, darken the envy of the poor, justify the greed of the rich, and encourage the aggression of the strong."²³

Much of what is considered moral education or beneficial to the moral development of children fails to nurture the moral imagination. However, it is only the approach to teaching ethics that

²² Maria Tatar, *Off With Their Heads! Fairy Tales and the Culture of Childhood* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 34.

²³ *Ibid.*, 35.

awakens and enlivens the moral imagination that will persuade children that “courage is the ultimate test of good character, that honesty is essential for trust and harmony among individuals, and that humility and a magnanimous spirit are goods greater than the prizes won by selfishness, pride, or the unscrupulous exercise of position and power.”²⁴ The moral imagination is not a thing, not even so much as some kind of talent, as it is “the very process by which one makes metaphors out of images given by experience and then employs these metaphors to find and suppose moral correspondences in experience.”²⁵ Mark Johnson, a philosophy professor at the University of Oregon who has researched and written on this subject, defines the moral imagination as “an ability to imaginatively discern various possibilities for acting in a given situation and to envision the potential help and harm that are likely to result from a given action.”²⁶ This definition implies that the moral imagination involves being able to morally evaluate the possibilities and their consequences. Johnson claims that our fundamental moral concepts, our understanding of situations, and our reasoning about those situations are all imaginatively structured and based on metaphor. In this sense, the imagination plays an essential role in ethical deliberation.

The moral imagination is active, for good or bad, strongly or weakly, every moment of our lives, in our sleep as well as when we are awake. Although it is always active, the moral imagination needs nurture and proper exercise, or else it will wither and become weak, much like a muscle in the body that is not used. “The richness or poverty of the moral imagination depends upon the richness or poverty of the knowledge and experience of the given person.”²⁷ When children are young and depend on parents and other figures that provide custodial care for them, they are especially open to the development of moral imagination through experience provided to them by these people. These realities are evident and acknowledged when people argue and discuss what kind of education or recreation children should have.

Unfortunately, more often than not, society is failing to provide children with the kinds of experience that nurture and build

²⁴ Abler, “The Moral of The Story.”

²⁵ Upright, “To Tell a Tale,” 17.

²⁶ Mark Johnson, *Moral Imagination: Implication of Cognitive Sciences for Ethics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 190.

²⁷ Upright, “To Tell a Tale,” 17.

the moral imagination. Joe Winston is a professor at the University of Warwick in England who specializes in research of the relationship between drama, traditional tales, and moral education. He is known for his in-service work with teachers, and claims that one measure of the impoverishment of the moral imagination in the rising generation is their “inability to recognize, make, or to use metaphors.”²⁸ Currently, most young adults do not lack an awareness of morality, although many may be puzzled about its foundation or lack personal ownership. When they read a novel, they are often confused because they are unable to find the inner connections of character, action, and narrative provided by the author’s own figurative imagination. It is not the case that these young people lack a practical definition of a metaphor; most have been provided with such a definition numerous times in English classes throughout their schooling. They seem to lack, however, “a personal knowledge of metaphors that only an active imagination engenders.”²⁹ Some scholars argue that this is because in the past, these students had come to believe that all they needed to do was look for the so-called “facts” in a book, which are “things whose meaning belongs to their use and whose use requires relatively little interpretation.”³⁰ It has been argued that we currently live in a culture in which metaphors are discarded facts, and young minds have been trained to identify and retain these facts with little to no interpretation necessary. Meanwhile, the moral imagination is left unguarded and untrained.

Fairy tales transport the reader into other worlds that are fresh with wonder, surprise, and danger. They challenge readers to make sense of those other worlds, to navigate their way through them, and to imagine themselves in the place of the characters depicted in the story. The safety and assurance of these adventures of the imagination are grounded in the fact that “risks can be taken without having to endure all the consequences of failure; the joy is in discovering how these risky adventures might eventuate in satisfactory and happy outcomes.”³¹ The concept of self and the notion of self-actualization are transformed, and the images and metaphors found in these stories stay with the readers even after they have returned to the “real” world. After reading a fairy tale, such as

²⁸ “Careful the Tale You Tell,” 91.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 92.

³¹ Bettelheim, *The Uses of Enchantment*, 47.

“Beauty and the Beast,” a child’s moral imagination is bound to have been stimulated and sharpened.

These stories offer powerful images of good and evil, virtue and vice, right and wrong. Additionally, the characters in the stories that a child has come to love and admire set an example of making ethical decisions, acting with virtue, and maintaining a moral standing, all while enduring hardships and being tested. The influence of these characters will drive the imagination to “translate these experiences and images into the constitutive elements of self-identity and into metaphors that the child will use to interpret the world that they experience.”³² In other words, children will take the situations and characters found in the story and relate them to their own lives and the kind of person they want to become, as well as the world in which they live. Further, children will take the moral implications of fairy tales and apply them to the context of their own lives. As a result, the child grows increasingly capable directing themselves through the world with a developed moral character and a commitment to virtue.

When the moral imagination is awake, the virtues are truly brought to life, and are filled with personal, existential, and social significance. The portrayal of virtue and morality does not need to be the dry and lifeless data of moral theories and ethical rules; “they can take on a life that attracts and awakens the desire to own them for oneself.”³³ Society needs to recognize the effective forms of teaching virtue and developing moral character that are faithful to the ancient and true vocation of the teacher, which is “to make persons into mature and whole human beings, able to stand face to face with the truth about themselves and others, with the desire to correct their faults and to emulate goodness and truth wherever it is found.”³⁴ Greater advantage should be taken of the power and influence in fairy tales to develop the moral character of children. Rather than shelter children from life’s evils, we can equip them with the tools needed to face obstacles and tests head-on and with confidence. The struggle against difficulties in life is an unavoidable, intrinsic part of the human experience. If one does not shy away, but rather “steadfastly meets unexpected and often unjust hardships, one masters all obstacles and at the end emerges victorious.”³⁵

³² *Ibid.*, 48.

³³ Winston, “Careful the Tale You Tell,” 93.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Ostery, “Magical Growth and Moral Lessons,” 50.

Through legendary characters and magical events, fairy tales portray the importance and benefits of living the good life. These stories, with their lessons of virtue and ethics, influence children in the development of their moral character. While fairy tales have been criticized as portraying worlds of fantasy that lack any kind of valuable knowledge, these criticisms fail to consider that they also pay close attention to the real moral “laws” of character and virtue. These laws can be seen as norms of behavior that are realized in “patterns of relation between agents, actions, others, and the world.”³⁶ Children are rationally capable of grasping, understanding, and being influenced by these norms that are depicted in the characters of the stories. These norms become habit, however, only when lived; or, as in the case of fairy tales, “experienced vicariously and imaginatively through the artful delineation of character and plot in the story.”³⁷ Fairy tales have the capacity to influence and inform the development of moral character of children because the depicted characters portray the benefits of maintaining moral standards in the face of obstacles and tragedies, and of remaining committed to virtue when it may have been easier not to do so. Fairy tales portray legendary characters that remain virtuous in the face of hardship, make the right decisions in the most challenging of situations, and go on to live “happily ever after.” The fantastic adventures and magical events found in these stories awaken the moral imagination of children and present them with moral principles and virtues in a context that is vivid and understandable. Fairy tales influence the moral development of children and offer the path to the good life.

³⁶ Bettelheim, *The Uses of Enchantment*, 12.

³⁷ Upright, “To Tell a Tale,” 19.

Jacques Maritain and the Notion of Connatural Knowledge

Mark Cusick

Mark Cusick is a seminary student from the archdiocese of Washington, D.C. Mark received his undergraduate degree in psychology from the University of Miami (Coral Gables, Florida) in 2006. After graduating from Miami, he was hired as a research assistant for the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Maryland. While he was living in the D.C. metro area, Mark's interest in the priesthood peaked and, led by the Spirit, he entered the seminary in 2007. His interests include reading Catholic literature, playing tennis, and listening to jazz music.

Jacques Maritain (1882–1973) develops a multi-tiered system of knowledge in which knowledge can be organized into two realms including natural and supernatural knowledge.

Supernatural knowledge is human knowledge which is assented to with the help of revelation. This is further subdivided into theological (knowledge of the life of God) and mystical knowledge (knowledge gained through grace). Maritain's structure of natural knowledge is subdivided into three types: scientific, philosophical, and connatural. Scientific knowledge which includes the study of being investigated by measuring the perceivable signs and symbols of objects is called "empirical."¹ The second type of knowledge is philosophical, which investigates the *essence* or *being* of things. Philosophical knowledge progresses step by step through the use of reason. The third type of natural knowledge is connatural knowledge. According to Maritain, one does not gain connatural knowledge through step by step philosophizing. Instead knowledge by connaturality is achieved "in our very being."² In other words, connatural knowledge is produced in the intellect but does not come

¹ Jacques Maritain, *The Range of Reason* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), 8.

² *Ibid.*, 23.

from conceptual connections of by way of demonstration.³ Maritain says that we know something connaturally “by looking at and consulting what we are and the inner bents or propensities of our own being.”⁴ This paper explores the conception of connatural knowledge proposed by Jacques Maritain.

The presence of connatural knowledge may be observed in everyday moral experience. In *The Range of Reason*, Maritain discusses the virtue of fortitude and says that a person may be able to know what the virtue requires without having knowledge of the principles of moral philosophy. He says that a person can possess the virtue in his powers of will and desire, have it embodied within him, and thus be in accordance with it, or “co-natured” with it, in his very being.⁵ Thus, when a person is asked a question about the virtue of fortitude, he is able to provide the right answer not through conceptual knowledge of virtues, but through inclination. In other words a person has connatural knowledge when his inner dispositions incline him to choose some virtue such as fortitude. Maritain expresses that in connatural knowledge the intellect is influenced by affective inclinations and the dispositions of the will. These affective tendencies work in conjunction with the intellect and guide the will to choose the virtuous behavior. So for example, the woman whose husband is sick and cannot work is forced to work to provide for the family. Rather than feeling despair over her difficulties, the wife, guided by her affection for the well-being of her family, chooses to work to support the family. It should be noted that Maritain recognizes the difficulty in explaining connatural knowledge. He states that it “is really and genuinely knowledge, though obscure and perhaps incapable of giving account of itself, or of being translated into words.”⁶

St. Thomas Aquinas’ account of wisdom in the *Summa Theologica* addresses the idea of connatural knowledge. He states that correct judgment according to the Eternal Law is what defines wisdom. Further, there is a twofold distinction to wisdom: “First, on account of perfect use of reason, secondly, on account of a certain

³ Raymond Dennehy, “Maritain’s ‘Intellectual Existentialism’: An Introduction to his Metaphysics and Epistemology,” in *Understanding Maritain: Philosopher and Friend*, ed. Deal Hudson and Matthew Mancini (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1987), 216.

⁴ *The Range of Reason*, 23.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

connaturality with the matter about which one has to judge.”⁷ Clearly the first path to wisdom denotes right judgment after reason has made its inquiry in the matter – “if he has the science of morals.” The second path is less clear as to what Aquinas means by “connaturality.” Aquinas refers to wisdom as the ability to make correct judgments about Divine things given a “connaturality” with what we judge. He provides the example of chastity, stating that the man who has the habit of chastity is wise in his judgments because of a kind of connaturality with chastity, suggesting a kind of habitual disposition. In another place, Aquinas says that one reason that a man takes pleasure in giving to others is because he has acquired a habitual inclination for doing so.⁸ This kind of connatural action of giving to others explains the man’s inclination for acting generously. Therefore, connaturality may be described as a habit toward right judgment which does not require the aid of reason.

Connaturality concerning Divine things can also be considered as a gift of grace. Snell speculates that because connaturality concerning Divine things is a gift of grace, “we receive connaturality just as Hierotheus is *patiens*, receptive, to Divine things. Connaturality is not then created by us but exists in potency, capable of actualization through grace, but not our own product.” Aquinas’ description provides the foundation that connatural knowledge is not a product of discursive reason but operates by virtue of grace. In other words, “sympathy or connaturality for Divine things is the result of charity, which unites us to God.”⁹ Thus at first glance, connaturality reveals that it is a knowledge directly linked to human affections, not achieved through the use of reason, and is the result of a habitual inclination to doing good. Further, connatural knowledge of Divine things is a gift given to one by God.

Maritain takes a distinctively non-spiritual approach in explaining the moral dimension of connatural knowledge. According to Maritain, “when a person makes a free decision, he takes into account, not only all that he possesses of moral science and factual information, and which is manifested to him in concepts and notions, but also all the secret elements of evaluation which depends on what he is, and which are known to him through inclination.”¹⁰ This notion of knowledge enables a person to choose not to do

⁷ *ST II-II*, q. 45, a. 2.

⁸ *ST I-II*, q. 32, a. 6.

⁹ *ST II-II*, q. 45, a. 2.

¹⁰ *The Range of Reason*, 26.

something because of the implicit knowledge that the act is wrong. A person understands, without quite being able to state why in formal terms, that some proposed act is wrong and thus refrains from the act.¹¹ Maritain suggests that the reason that people avoid choosing wrongly is because they reason connaturally, or by inclination, to the proper conclusion.¹²

It has been noted that connaturality relies on experience rather than on reason. One should understand experience not as looking at good behavior and modeling one's own behavior after it. Rather, it is the direct experience (or intuition) of knowing what is right (or wrong) through inclining toward the good. Maritain explains that the concept of Natural Law is something that is known connaturally and not through conceptual knowledge. He states that "the judgments in which Natural Law is made manifest to practical Reason . . . proceed from that *connaturality* or *congeniality* through which what is consonant with the essential inclinations of human nature is grasped by the intellect as good; what is dissonant as bad."¹³ Maritain implies that Natural Law is not discovered through the use of man's natural reason and thus through the use of conceptual knowledge. Maritain insists that man is "co-natured" with the primary principles of Natural Law and that he generally seeks to do what is right and to avoid evil. In other words, man possesses in his inner being the primary rules of Natural Law as they express themselves through spontaneous human inclinations.¹⁴ Thus, before the explicit conclusions of Natural Law were formed, men knew by inclination that it is wrong to kill the innocent.¹⁵

Jacques Maritain says certain consequences follow from the notion that the principles of Natural Law are naturally known without the aid of conceptual knowledge. Consider the idea of justice. Man has the idea of justice because justice is a good which all men seek. Justice is connatural insofar as man is aware of the existence or absence of justice in novel situations. Therefore, a particular act of stealing (provided that we have not seen or experienced this particular act previously) can be easily seen as unjust. As a note, Budziszewski says that a person can deviate from the connatural knowledge of a certain virtue because he or she has

¹¹ James Schall, *Jacques Maritain* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 92.

¹² *Ibid.*, 93.

¹³ *The Range of Reason*, 27.

¹⁴ Dennehy, "Maritain's 'Intellectual Existentialism,'" 217.

¹⁵ Schall, *Jacques Maritain*, 92.

been habituated to believing the opposite is actually a good.¹⁶ Provided that there is no impediment to understanding the virtue of justice, Maritain would say that the general principle of justice is known connaturally. As a consequence of knowledge through inclination, Maritain says that the precepts of Natural Law are known in an undemonstrable manner.¹⁷ Thus it is the case that men are unable to give account and rationally justify their most basic moral beliefs. Maritain says that this does not show the irrationality or intrinsic invalidity of these beliefs but actually shows the beliefs' essential *naturality* and *greater* validity.¹⁸

The concept of primary and secondary nature plays a key role in understanding connaturality. Budziszewski, quoting Aquinas, posits that “although man is made to be rightly disposed to the universal principles of action, he must *become* rightly disposed to the particular principles of action.”¹⁹ Further, he says that the way man can be ordered to particular principles is by acquiring connatural habits. Take for instance that the “first nature” of a man is to be disposed to love his children. The “second nature” is fatherly love in situations which have not been previously experienced. Before becoming a father, a man knows that it is good to love his children but may not know the particular actions which are required for fatherly love. Once a man becomes a father he is now exposed to knowing the particular principles (e.g. displaying fatherly affections for the family, perseverance through all-night school projects) which are needed for fatherly love of children. Budziszewski suggests that the father is not drawing inferences from premises nor is he making conceptual progress on how to love his children. Rather, “he acquires some disposition to judge rightly what father-love requires, even in novel situations to which his previous knowledge does not apply.”²⁰ Thus, virtuous (“second nature”) actions are built upon implicit natural inclinations (“first nature”) which enables a man to acquire particular principles of fatherly love. Connaturality may then be said to be knowledge that is built upon primary and universal principles of morality.

¹⁶ J. Budziszewski, “The Natural, the Connatural, and the Unnatural,” Jacques Maritain Center conference presentation, http://maritain.nd.edu/jmc/ti04/budz.htm#n_1; part IV, par. 3, 4.

¹⁷ *The Range of Reason*, 27.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 28.

¹⁹ “The Natural, the Connatural, and the Unnatural,” part III, par. 3.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, part III, par. 6.

The notion of intuition is an important characteristic in the notion of connaturality. By intuition, Maritain means “a spurting forth of the right idea, an inclination of intelligence toward the true or the reinforcement of its virtue under some extrinsic influence.”²¹ Maritain acknowledges that the intellect can have this intuition because of the harmony between various faculties of the soul and their influence on the intellect. Haggerty shows the impact of the soul’s internal influences on knowledge stating that the point is “the inherent spontaneity of the intellect open to the play of innumerable internal influences upon its activity.”²² For example, the influence of the affective faculties and will are noted for the influence they exert on the intellect. One may consider how a person knows that there is a dangerous situation simply from a “funny feeling” which leads to this intuition. Maritain mentions that this intuition is a sort of sentiment or flair for sound judgment and Haggerty calls the faculty that contributes to this knowledge a kind of sixth sense.²³ One may say that connatural knowledge is stimulated by internal influences such as affect and will that produce connatural sympathies leading one to have an intuition of the truth. Such truth may range from a feeling of a dangerous situation to the choice to live chastely.

It is worth noting that connatural knowledge thus far has focused on the practical dimension of right and wrong rather than on the speculative dimension. Maritain says that practical knowledge has a dynamic tendency toward concrete action.²⁴ In other words, the mode of operation for connaturality seems to be enmeshed in concrete actions. Maritain posits that the branch of knowledge which considers concrete actions is called “practically practical science” because their constitutive elements are proximate principles for the carrying out of concrete action.²⁵ However, Maritain explains that the reason that connaturality is able to know truth which is usually reserved for the universality of speculative principles is because “knowledge by connaturality permeates and governs this very universality.”²⁶ This is to say that a person already has in him (in an obscure manner) the concepts or inclinations of practically practical

²¹ David Haggerty, *Jacques Maritain and the Notion of Connaturality: The Valid Role of Nonconceptual Moral Knowledge in the Existential Order* (Ph.D. dissertation, Pontifical Lateran University, 1995), 105.

²² *Ibid.*, 106.

²³ *Ibid.*, 108.

²⁴ Quoted in *ibid.*, 80.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 96.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 99.

knowledge prior to conscious realization. The man who has connatural inclinations to choosing the right action can be said to “invest” the universal concepts from practically practical knowledge with “cognitive authority” because “a type of perception through nonconceptual means has already invoked their truth obscurely prior to conceptualization.”²⁷ In this way, connatural knowledge is an action-oriented knowledge which enables a person to know what to do from a connatural (however obscure) understanding of universal principles.

One major question about connatural knowledge is the curious nature of where it comes from. Does man’s inclination to know the primary principles and therefore his ability to reason connaturally come from innate ideas? Or does this inclination come from collective experiences and develop over time? The answer is not one or the other but both. First, on knowing Natural Law Maritain says, “human reason knows Natural Law, but has no part, either in causing it to *exist*, or even in causing it to *be known*.”²⁸ Maritain insists that uncreated Reason is the only reason at play in *establishing* the Natural Law and in making the Natural Law *known*. Maritain believes that Natural Law’s existence is due to Divine Reason who creates human nature and also makes Natural Law known to human reason because of the inclinations by which human reason “listens” when it knows Natural Law. Therefore, Maritain answers the question of the origin of our connatural inclinations and the existence of Natural Law. These elements must arise from Divine Reason who inclines our natural reason to “listen to” and be “attuned to” the concepts of Natural Law.

As to whether or not Natural Law is known to us by reason’s gradual progress in grasping the principles of Natural Law, I believe Maritain would say that our knowledge becomes more attuned to the good with successive repetition of choosing the good. This follows from the idea that connaturality is a habitual inclination to choose rightly.²⁹ However, Maritain would deny that moral philosophy functions to discover Natural Law. Instead, the proper place for moral philosophy in regard to Natural Law is to analyze and elucidate moral standards and rules of conduct whose validity was previously discovered in an undemonstrable manner and in a

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 100.

²⁸ *The Range of Reason*, 28.

²⁹ *ST I-II*, q. 32, a. 6.

non-conceptual way.³⁰ Again, the point of moral philosophy is that it does not discover the Natural Law since “from the time of the caveman” men have known Natural Law by way of inclination.

In the epistemology of Jacques Maritain there is a desire to explore and elucidate the full range of human knowledge, from the connatural to the supernatural.³¹ Maritain grew up in the aftermath of the Enlightenment in which modern philosophers sought to characterize knowledge as science and denied that metaphysics and theology could convey truth. Furthermore, Descartes definition of man as a “thinking being” places reason on a pedestal as the only instrument for obtaining knowledge. This idea of reality leaves no room for the philosopher to consider nonconceptual knowledge and connatural knowledge. Furthermore, Maritain is critical of the Empiricists “for reducing all knowledge to sensation and entertaining a pessimistic view of the human intellect’s power to know.”³² Maritain, supporting the venture of Thomistic philosophers, desires to show the human capacity for non-conceptual knowledge while at the same time acknowledging Aristotle’s metaphysical adage: “All knowledge begins in the senses.”

Therefore, Maritain’s account of connaturality gives a glimpse of the realm of knowledge which is innate by means of the work of Divine Reason. This knowledge allows us to know the principles of Natural Law which are embedded deep in us and by which we are able to know the distinction between good and bad. We know also that connaturality, like any habit, can be strengthened with multiple occurrences of choosing the right action. Thus, connatural moral knowledge can be developed through our experiences such as when love for children becomes intimate fatherly love. Connatural knowledge can also be validated by the conceptualizations and reasons of moral philosophy which analyzes and checks the correctness of our inbuilt inclinations. Maritain presents connatural knowledge as one way to harmonize philosophy with life, intellect with reality.³³ Therefore, an understanding of connatural knowledge is a step toward uniting the truth of the connatural inclinations of our human nature with the truth of the empirical world.

³⁰ *The Range of Reason*, 28.

³¹ Dennehy, “Maritain’s ‘Intellectual Existentialism,’” 218.

³² *Ibid.*, 219.

³³ *Ibid.*, 218.

An Argument against Hume's Concept of Sympathy

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“Sympathy” has had many meanings throughout the years, ranging from “sharing feelings with others” to “relations between organs” to “something that promotes reciprocation in another individual.”¹ Most commonly, sympathy is regarded as “a feeling of compassion for another human being.” The Enlightenment philosopher David Hume gives a definition of sympathy that strays from any purely emotional ties, and uses it as a means of forming a foundation for morality in all human beings. In his *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, Hume states that sympathy is a “tender regard for others”² that all creatures possess. However, there is ample evidence from modern science that suggests otherwise—that some humans seem to lack sympathy entirely.

Hume's idea of sympathy in the *Treatise* does not revolve around an emotional state: “Hume thinks of sympathy primarily as the principle which explains how feelings and opinions can be transferred from one individual to another.”³ In Hume's explanation of sympathy, he “makes it clear that it is not either pity or compassion because he regards it as a means by which pity and compassion are themselves communicated.”⁴ Sympathy is the act of ‘moving’ one's thoughts and emotions to another human being, sort of like an e-mail between brains. It is a result of individuals acting as

¹ “Compassion,” Dictionary.com, 2009, <http://dictionary.reference.com>.

² David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (London, 1751), 25.

³ Philip Mercer, *Sympathy and Ethics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 25.

⁴ John J. Jenkins, *Understanding Hume*, ed. Peter Lewis and Geoffrey Madell (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992), 149.

‘mirrors,’ “the motion of one communicat[ing] itself to the rest; so all the affections pass readily from one person to another, and beget correspondent movements in every human creature.”⁵ Hume further explains it as experiencing an emotion through the recognition of “some inner mental event.”⁶ Thus, I could feel an emotion of pride towards something that does not involve me, because I see that it is something necessary of pride. Since human minds act similarly, they are able to recognize the aspects of what is happening to themselves and the others around them, and are able to act accordingly. A poor man may be downtrodden because we look upon him and think, “That man must be downtrodden” in the same way that we look towards a rich man and give him our approval, which leads him to be pleased.

Hume mentions sympathy in two of his works, *A Treatise of Human Nature* and *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*. In the *Treatise*, Hume argues that sympathy contains a psychological component that he later disregards in the *Enquiry*. The purpose of disregarding the psychological component in later works was that it caused a fundamental flaw in his argument: “the heightened state of self-awareness that Hume’s thesis requires only occurs in special circumstances and certainly cannot be described as being ‘always present to us.’”⁷ The psychological component reveals itself through our perception, not our emotions: “in the case of sympathy, we are shown how we may acquire a belief simply through perceiving its existence in some other person.”⁸ Once this aspect is removed from Hume’s definition of sympathy, as it is in his *Enquiry*, the argument becomes sound. There appears to be no evidence that a sympathy based on eliciting a similar response from others is not evident in all creatures. However, this argument is called into question by new evidence of disorders in modern society.

Sympathy is often understandably associated with empathy, which “broadly refers to our reaction to the observed experiences of others.”⁹ In fact, “empathy can be expected to lead to sympathy or

⁵ David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739–40), 575.

⁶ Mercer, *Sympathy and Ethics*, 25.

⁷ Jenkins, *Understanding Hume*, 151.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 152.

⁹ Kimberley Rogers, Jason Hassenstab, Oliver T. Wolf, Isabel Dziobek and Antonio Convit, “Who Cares? Revisiting Empathy in Asperger Syndrome,” *Journal of Autism & Developmental Disorders* 37 (August 2006): 709.

to co-occur.”¹⁰ A deficit in empathetic feelings and reactions is commonly associated with Asperger syndrome, which is an Autism Spectrum Disorder, or ASD. When testing individuals with Asperger syndrome, researchers have tested mainly the “cognitive empathy” aspect and not the “affective empathy” aspect. Cognitive empathy is the ability to view the world from another person’s perspective, whereas affective empathy is the emotional component in response to another person’s emotional state. Hume’s original definition of sympathy leans towards the concept of cognitive empathy, where there is transference of ideas and emotional states. However, in his second definition of sympathy, in the *Enquiry*, Hume’s definition overlaps with the concept of affective empathy, where “sympathy is another name for social feeling, humanity, benevolence, natural philanthropy, rather than the name of the process by which the social feeling has been constructed out of non-social or individual feeling.”¹¹

Although a scarcity of cognitive empathy is apparent in Asperger people, the affective empathy is still intact, providing for Hume’s statement that sympathy is evident in all creatures. In an experiment that was conducted, videos were shown of children expressing different emotions. After the videos had been viewed, the children were asked to tell the researchers what emotion was expressed and how they felt after watching them. Despite lower scores than ‘normal’ individuals, “the authors still felt the autistic children demonstrated some empathic skills and state in the discussion that the children with autism performed ‘surprisingly well’ and ‘showed considerable ability . . . to respond empathetically to the feelings of others.’”¹² Further experiments were conducted on Asperger individuals, providing empirical evidence that the affective empathy of those with the disorder is indeed full-functioning and normal by all standards. Therefore, by Hume’s reformulated definition, sympathy is evident in these individuals.

Another disorder that is commonly linked with a lack of empathy and social regard is Antisocial Personality Disorder, which, unlike Asperger Syndrome, emphasizes a complete lack of empathy and not just a partial one. Antisocial Personality Disorder, which is

¹⁰ Paul A. Miller and Nancy Eisenberg, “The Relation of Empathy to Aggressive and Externalizing/Antisocial Behavior,” *Psychological Bulletin* 103, no. 3 (1988): 325.

¹¹ Rico Vitz, “Sympathy and Benevolence in Hume’s Moral Psychology,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 42, no. 3 (2004), <http://muse.jhu.edu>.

¹² Rogers, et. al., “Who Cares?” 710.

often called sociopathic or psychopathic personality, is a mental disorder whose common symptoms include “a failure to conform to social or legal codes, a lack of anxiety and guilt, and irresponsible behaviors.”¹³ The lack of guilt, or empathy, is a symptom found in many of the criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder, and seems to be one of the trademark issues. These individuals seem to have absent “genuine feelings of love and loyalty toward others and [a lack of] concern over the detrimental consequences of their behaviors.”¹⁴ Although this disorder is rarely diagnosed before the age of eighteen and only affects about two percent of the United States populace, these individuals commonly exhibit symptoms throughout their early childhood, giving evidence that this disorder is something that a person is born with and does not gain later in life. Children who grow up to be diagnosed with Antisocial Personality Disorder are often found burning and torturing small animals when they are younger, and show very little reason behind this or regret after the action is performed. Under Hume’s terming of sympathy, Antisocial individuals fail the test. They show absolutely no “regard towards others,” tender or otherwise. On the contrary, people diagnosed with this mental illness often take advantage of other people, “[lying] or feign[ing] emotional feelings to callously manipulate others.”¹⁵ Some researchers argue that the lack of empathy and care for others may be a result of inability to “walk in other people’s shoes,” or see from their perspective. In 1948 and 1970, two scientists (Gough and Hare) gave their input: “a history of antisocial behavior is the result of a deficiency in perspective taking, which would be expected to be associated with lower levels of sympathy.”¹⁶ Since these people are unable to see other people feel and react to the world around them, they are unable to share in the emotions of that other person or to react to those emotions.

The presence of Antisocial individuals gives evidence in support of my argument that not all creatures possess Hume’s revised concept of sympathy, as he had stated. Instead, there are certain individuals who lack this from birth, and not from some direct exposure from the outside world. Antisocial people are the

¹³ David Sue, Derald Wing Sue and Stanley Sue, *Understanding Abnormal Behavior* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2006), 244.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 251.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Paul A. Miller and Nancy Eisenberg, “The Relation of Empathy to Aggressive and Externalizing/Antisocial Behavior,” *Psychological Bulletin* 103, no. 3 (1988): 326.

epitome of a lack of moral structure, of which sympathy is an essential foundational part. They act on their own behalf, and feel little emotion (this includes positive emotions) or no emotion at all after performing a harmful deed to others, including humans and animals.

In summation, Hume's argument for sympathy originally contained many flaws, but Hume eventually changed it and adapted it, disregarding the psychological component. Hume believed that sympathy was part of a universal principle, and that all creatures (human or otherwise) contained this aspect of sympathy. Asperger Syndrome could have previously debunked Hume's argument when he defined sympathy in the *Treatise*, but, by the new definition, people with this illness are just as normal and well-functioning as any other individuals, since they still have affective empathy. However, individuals with Antisocial Personality Disorder are a direct counterexample of the concept of sympathy, since they have no feelings of guilt, anxiety, or remorse after performing a disturbing or harmful act against another creature or human. Therefore, not all individuals have this "innate" form of sympathy, which is a fatal objection to Hume's argument for the universal presence of sympathy and its uses as a principle for the foundation of morality.

***Dasein*, Authenticity, and Free Will: A Modern-Day Thomistic Response to Heidegger**

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The rise of existentialism began in response to the modern worldview of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. While generally a difficult term to define, what is meant by existentialism is simply the understanding that the human individual can no longer rely on any sort of fixed foundation (such as religious beliefs or the ancient/medieval understanding of a human “essence”) from which to determine the proper end of man. Rather, it is man himself who determines his own end.¹ One of the most renowned existential philosophers is a German by the name of Martin Heidegger. Born in the year 1889, Heidegger spent his early academic years studying at the University of Freiburg and working as an assistant to the “father of phenomenology,” Edmund Husserl. In 1927, Heidegger penned what is considered his greatest academic work, *Being and Time*. In this work he explores the nature of Being, most especially that of humans (*Dasein*). This paper will primarily consider Heidegger’s concept of authenticity and its relationship to the medieval understanding of free will, seeking to affirm the “existentialia,” or structural features, of inauthentic and authentic *Dasein*, while arguing that there must necessarily be more to the being of *Dasein* than pure choice.

¹ Charles Guignon and Derk Pereboom, “Introduction” to *Existentialism: Basic Writings*, ed. Charles Guignon and Derk Pereboom (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2001), xvii.

Heidegger's ontology begins with Aristotle's claim in book one of the *Metaphysics* that "[a]ll humans by nature desire to know."² It is within the very nature of man to be concerned with the question of Being and to seek a fuller understanding of it. In fact, Heidegger even says that "[t]he question of Being, the striving for an understanding of Being, is the basic determinant of [human] existence."³ However, he rejects the further developments of traditional ontology, claiming that they offer a distorted perspective of the nature of reality. Rather than seeing objects as simply taking up matter and space (being "there"), which is the objectified outlook of traditional ontology, Heidegger proposes that most objects in the world can be defined as "equipment," having the fundamental characteristic of "readiness-to-hand." Equipment, in this sense, he says, "can genuinely show itself only in dealings cut to its own measure; but in such dealings an entity of this kind is not *grasped* thematically as an occurring Thing, nor is the equipment-structure known as such even in the using."⁴ What is meant here is that we do not see objects as simply as material in space and time, but that we grasp their meaning from our interaction with them. Heidegger gives the example of hammering with a hammer. When we hammer a nail with a hammer, we are not aware of the hammer as an object itself, but we are aware of it as equipment, as being exactly what it is suppose to be by hammering. He explains, "The less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered."⁵ It is in this distinction that Heidegger rejects traditional ontology, claiming that we cannot understand objects as containing meaning in themselves unless we see them as "ready-to-hand."

Also important to understanding Heidegger's ontology is his definition of the human person, *Dasein*. "*Dasein* is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, Being is an *issue* for it," he says in the beginning of *Being and Time*.⁶ *Dasein* is the entity

² Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle (Des Moines, Iowa: The Peripatetic Press, 1979), 12.

³ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, excerpted in *Existentialism: Basic Writings*, ed. Charles Guignon and Derk Pereboom (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2001), 210.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 225.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 225.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 213.

which “has its being to be,” thereby claiming a unique relationship with Being.

Further, what is inherent to *Dasein* is its “mineness.” “*Dasein*,” says Heidegger, “is an entity which in each case I myself am.”⁷ He continues to state that this “mineness” belongs to *Dasein* “as the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible.”⁸ It is these concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity that provoke great interest, especially in consideration of the medieval view of free will, which will be discussed more in depth later in this paper.

Dasein, in its everydayness, often misunderstands itself. It sees and takes its understanding of itself from the “world.” As Heidegger puts it, “The kind of Being which belongs to *Dasein* is such that, in understanding its own Being, it has a tendency to do so in terms of that entity towards which it comports itself proximally and in a way which is essentially constant—in terms of the ‘world.’”⁹ *Dasein* often takes its understanding of its Being from the “they.”¹⁰ It takes its everyday possibilities of Being from the “they” and in fact, falls under subjection to the “they.” Guignon and Pereboom, in their brief introduction to Heidegger, explain it thus: “All our concrete possibilities of understanding and interpretation are drawn from the pool of interpretations opened by the public world in which we find ourselves.”¹¹ By allowing the “they” to determine who *Dasein* is, *Dasein* becomes, in a sense, dispensable. In this mode of Being, *Dasein* is inauthentic. Heidegger says, “As they-self, the particular *Dasein* has been *dispersed* into the ‘they,’ and must first find itself.”¹² The process of finding itself consists in anxiety, and the end is, hopefully, authenticity.

Anxiety is a way in which the world appears to *Dasein*: A way which reveals to *Dasein* that it is absorbed in the world and that it is not directed toward a particular thing. Essentially, *Dasein* becomes anxious about its own being in the world.¹³ It understands that it has allowed the “they” to dictate its being. Guignon and Pereboom

⁷ Ibid., 222.

⁸ Ibid., 222.

⁹ Ibid., 216.

¹⁰ Heidegger’s concept of the “they” is involved and cannot be discussed in full in this paper. See §26 and §27 of *Being and Time* for a further explanation.

¹¹ *Being and Time*, 204.

¹² Ibid., 235.

¹³ Class notes, Dr. Thane Naberhaus, “Contemporary Philosophy,” Mount St. Mary’s University, 27 March 2009.

write, “In anxiety the familiar world of equipment in which we find ourselves at home suddenly collapses into insignificance. The idea here seems to be that anxiety makes us see that the roles we play in everydayness are anonymous, ‘anyone’ roles.”¹⁴ This anxiety, however, leads to authentic *Dasein*: to a *Dasein* that “chooses” its own being rather than allowing the “they” to dictate it. “To say that we should ‘choose to choose,’” say Guignon and Pereboom, “is to say that we should embrace the choices we make, and that we should give structure to our lives by continuously reaffirming those choices in everything we do.”¹⁵ This is the mark of authentic *Dasein*, of someone who chooses his or her own being, who deliberately makes choices. Again they say, “To be authentic is to seize on some set of roles you have drawn from the public world and to make them into your own through a resolute and clear-sighted stand on them.”¹⁶ This is what Heidegger calls “resoluteness.”

Now, what must be clear in Heidegger’s concept of authenticity is that he believes it does not matter *what* a particular *Dasein* chooses, but only *that* it chooses. By saying this, he wants to emphasize *what* *Dasein* is essentially. For Heidegger, “Humans just *are* the stands they take in living out their lives. Humans *are* what they do. This point follows from the awareness that there is no fixed human essence given to us in advance—no ‘Form of Humanity’ or ‘proper function of humans’ that determines what we are and ought to be.”¹⁷ *Dasein* chooses itself from all possible possibilities, and by doing so “wins” itself. But there is no “guide” for *what* choices to make. All that matters is the act of choosing. In fact, this is how Heidegger defines *what* *Dasein* is, saying, “man’s distinctive feature lies in this, that he, as the being who thinks, is open to Being, face to face with Being; thus man remains referred to Being and so answers to it. *Man is essentially this relationship of responding to Being, and he is only this.*”¹⁸ *Dasein*, man, is possibility and making choices, according to Heidegger.

Although he has attempted to distance himself from most traditional ontology, Heidegger’s view of authenticity actually finds itself to have much in common with the medieval concept of free

¹⁴ *Being and Time*, 205.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 207

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Guignon and Pereboom, “Introduction,” 197.

¹⁸ Martin Heidegger, “The Principle of Identity,” in *Identity and Difference*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 31.

will. Thomas Aquinas, in his *Summa Theologica*, says, “Now man differs from irrational animals in this, that he is master of his actions.”¹⁹ This is a claim that Heidegger should have no difficulty accepting, for being a “master of his actions” essentially means being able to *choose*. Thomas continues, “Now man is master of his actions through his reason and will; whence, too, the free will is defined as *the faculty and will of reason*. Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from a **deliberate will**.”²⁰ This is the distinguishing feature of man, according to Thomas: that man has a free will and can thereby *choose* one thing over another. Irrational animals cannot do this, only man. To be human, then, is to choose. This ought to sound familiar, as it is the same definition that Heidegger gives of *Dasein*. Man is most human, Thomas says, when he is acting with a *deliberate will*. To choose deliberately is to be aware of one’s choice, to *choose to choose*. This is precisely Heidegger’s view of authenticity: *Dasein* is authentic when it chooses and is aware and deliberate in its choosing.

In this way, Thomas’s view of free will does not seem altogether different from Heidegger’s theory of authenticity. Even inauthentic *Dasein* seems to match with Thomas’s view. As quoted above, Thomas defines free will as “the faculty and will of reason.”²¹ But even the medievals recognized that not every human makes use of his reason. In fact, man often acts without using his reason or choosing deliberately. Thomas says of these actions, “And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called actions *of a man*, but not properly *human* actions, since they are not proper to man as man.”²² This way of being is *inauthentic*, as it does not properly use the faculty of reason and free will. Thomas and other medievals (particularly Augustine) have much to say about the human person and the use (or lack thereof) of free will and reason, but Heidegger delves much deeper into the “existential” of inauthenticity. He discovers great truths in his concept of the “they” and everyday *Dasein*, truths that build upon what the medieval philosophers previously thought. In this, Heidegger ought to be affirmed.

However, there are a few difficulties within Heidegger’s thought that need to be addressed. The first lies in his definition of

¹⁹ ST I-II, q. 1, a. 1. All quotations from the *Summa Theologica* are from the translation by the Fathers of the Dominican English Province.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*

man, of *Dasein*. He says, as quoted earlier, “Man is essentially this relationship of responding to Being, and he is only this.” But man cannot simply *be* his choices. He can *make* choices, but there must be a subject in order for a choice to be made. Even Heidegger’s concept of “mineness” cannot account for the necessity of a subject. Man cannot both *be*, essentially, his choices, and *make* choices at the same time. Such would be absurd. To say that man can make choices implies that there is something in man, that man is a subject. As a subject, man *possesses* the faculty of reason and free will. Therefore man is, as Aristotle defines him, a rational animal. Man is a body and a soul, possessing reason and free will.

Further, in Heidegger’s concept of authenticity, he claims that it does not matter what one chooses, but only *that* one chooses. This is directly related to what was previously discussed as well as his claim that there is “no fixed human essence . . . no ‘Form of Humanity’ or ‘proper function of humans’ that determines what we are and ought to be.”²³ There is a fallacy in Heidegger’s thought, however: mainly that man’s end is to choose. But man must have an end that is more than simply to choose. Thomas speaks of man having a final end or a final cause: something towards which man moves. This is necessary if it is true that man makes any choices whatsoever, “For if the agent were not determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an end.”²⁴ Obviously this paper is not concerned with the *nature* of that end, which Aristotle holds is happiness and Thomas holds is God. Rather, the fact that man must have a particular end is clear. If it were not so, there would be no reason for man to choose one thing over another. In fact, it would be impossible. Consider the simple example of a man choosing to eat rather than take a nap. There must be a concrete reason for the man to choose one or the other: if to eat because he is hungry and wishes to satisfy his hunger, if to sleep because he is tired and wishes to rest his body. Regardless of which possibility he chooses, there is an end to his decision: satisfaction of hunger or rest for his body. As this is true on the individual level of all choices, all the more is it true universally for man. Inauthentic man moves towards his end without making

²³ Guignon and Pereboom, “Introduction,” 197.

²⁴ *ST* I-II, q. 1, a. 2.

deliberate choices, while authentic man moves towards his end using his reason and free will, making deliberate choices. Thus Thomas says, “Therefore those things that are possessed of reason, move themselves to an end; because they have dominion over their actions through their free will, which is the *faculty of will and reason*.”²⁵

The similarities between Heidegger’s philosophy of authenticity and the medieval concept of free will are striking, if not a bit surprising. Perhaps Heidegger would be appalled at such a comparison, but as has been shown in this paper, there is a clear parallel between the two. There are, of course, always distinctions to be made, and the most obvious one is the stark difference between Heidegger’s claim there is no essence of humanity and Thomas’s claim that there certainly is an essence to humanity. However, Heidegger’s claim is weakened by Thomas’s reasoning that man necessarily needs a final end in order to make any choices whatsoever, and being able to choose is at the heart of all of Heidegger’s ontology.

Every philosopher, whether one agrees with his philosophy or not, reveals some truth about mankind or the world in which we live. Although he is often rejected by neo-Thomists and those who hold to a more medieval and traditional ontology, Heidegger offers much insight into the truth of mankind and our world. His philosophy of authenticity and inauthenticity, in particular, ought not to be rejected, but rather refined, for it reveals a great truth about man and offers much to the phenomenology of man.

²⁵ Ibid.

***Galatians* versus *First Corinthians*: Spiritual Freedom versus the Other**

Brian Acton

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A surface reading of Paul's letter to the Galatians against his First Letter to the Corinthians seems to indicate, if not contradicting, at least opposing, teachings. In *Galatians* he depicts Christ's death on the cross as the fulfillment of the Law.¹ Further, based on this understanding, with Old Testament support, Paul posits that faith in Christ, not works of the Law, is how one is to be justified before the Lord—in a right relationship with God.² First Corinthians, on the other hand, lays out an ethical understanding of this new faith. Is Paul contradicting himself? Likely, he is not. Rather, it is important to note that these are letters written to specific communities in early Christianity that are tailored to the specific needs and issues of the particular community to whom it is addressed. So then, what can be gathered through an analysis of these two seemingly opposing letters? What can be made of Paul's theology if it is so situational that his teachings to different communities seem to contradict? First, an analysis of the differences in audience accounts for the differences in tone and issues being addressed between these two letters. Then, in order to resolve these differences, it shall then be shown that Paul's theology, his conception of what it means to be a follower of Christ, is one of spiritual freedom based in faith, and that his freedom ends with one's responsibility for the Christian community, as based on his Greco-Roman understanding of the body.

¹ Gal 2:16; 5:1.

² Ibid.

The audience of Paul's letter to the Galatians is unusual. It is the only letter addressed to a broad area versus a specific church. Additionally, the exact region to which it was written is also controversial—it is unknown whether the intended recipients were the barbarous northern region or if the term was an insult to the south. Either way, the group to which this letter was addressed was most likely pagan before their conversion to Christianity. Further, because this letter is addressed to a whole region instead of a specific church, it indicates that the issue being addressed was both a widespread problem and that it needed to be corrected promptly—with one broad sweeping letter rather than individual letters.³ *First Corinthians*, with its address of Corinth clearly identifiable and indisputable, was faced with entirely different issues.

Corinth, at the time of Paul, was a bustling city located on an isthmus, which made it ideal for trade with two harbors on each side of the isthmus. Due to its prominence in trade, it was a diverse city ethnically and was stereotyped as having a penchant for anomie and sexual license—even beyond some Greco-Roman standards.⁴ In addition to its propensity for “licentious behavior” and in testimony to its diversity, in the city of Corinth there were various divisions and allegiances in terms of politics, religion, and other public practices.⁵ The background of the two “areas” that Paul wrote to in these letters is called, by David Barr, the “World behind the Text.” An analysis of this “World” can provide, especially in Paul's case, an insight into the reasoning that shaped these respective letters. Such an analysis offers valid information from which the reader may infer, through Paul's tone and reason for writing.

The tone of *Galatians* is in accord with Paul's reason for writing—a widespread and serious issue. In chapter one of his letter to the Galatians, Paul's tone is one of rebuke.⁶ In addition, his use of the negative “not” in the affirmation found in the greeting, along with the recounting of his call, indicates a tone of clarification.⁷ Paul is angry and intends to set the record straight. Paul's tone in 1 Corinthians 1, on the other hand, is one of general instruction urging

³ David L. Barr, *New Testament Story: An Introduction* (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2008), 119–23.

⁴ 1 Cor 5:1.

⁵ Barr, *New Testament Story*, 127–28.

⁶ Gal 1:6.

⁷ Gal 1:1; 11–24.

unity.⁸ It is similar to Chapter 1 of *Galatians* in that Paul is reproaching the “ekklēsia” in a harsh manner.⁹ It is distinct from *Galatians*, on the other hand, in that Paul appears to be less furious with the Corinthians than he was with the Galatians—or at least he is tempering it for this letter. This inference is supported by his inclusion of a “Thanksgiving” section in his first letter to the Corinthians, whereas in his letter to the Galatians he forgoes this typically standard Pauline rhetorical construct to get at the heart of the matter right away.¹⁰ This, then, raises the question, what are the problems of these “assemblies” whom Paul is addressing?

One of the problems seems to be that the Galatians have accepted some other gospel.¹¹ In doing so, the Galatians have been so persuaded by the rhetoric of another, that it has “perverted” the content of the Gospel Paul had preached to them.¹² So, this raises two questions; what did Paul preach to the Galatians and how have they “perverted” this message? Paul’s gospel is a message of freedom in Christ, freedom from the bondage of the law.¹³ It seems that the “gospel” that they have accepted is a “fleshy” one; that is, this new gospel is based more on acceptance and observance of the Torah, especially in terms of circumcision. Paul reprimands the “Galatians” for accepting this bondage of the “perverted” gospel of the flesh in light of the freedom offered in Christ through faith.¹⁴ This problem that has arisen is related to their pagan beginnings before their conversion at the hands of Paul.

Paul lectures the Galatians on this individual, spiritualistic freedom in the context of the letter as part of his argument of faith versus observance of the law. However, this argument is also in reference to the freedom that this relationship provides to the Galatians. It offers freedom from their previous bondage to fate in their pagan beliefs or, what Paul terms “elemental powers.”¹⁵ These “elemental powers” refer to the crushing psychological force that pagan beliefs of Greek origin often carried with them. For example, as illustrated in Homer’s stories and the plays of Sophocles, the characters are often portrayed as being detrimentally at the whim of

⁸ 1 Cor 1:10–11.

⁹ 1 Cor 1:14–15.

¹⁰ 1 Cor 1:4–9.

¹¹ Gal 1:6.

¹² Gal 1:7.

¹³ Gal 2:16; 5:1.

¹⁴ Gal 3:1–5.

¹⁵ Gal 4:8–10.

fate.¹⁶ Further, in accepting the earthly by denying the spiritual freedom offered through faith in Christ crucified, the “Galatians” have bound themselves to the law or the earthly. This acceptance would be similar to reverting back to the enslavement of their pagan beliefs.¹⁷ This is why Paul’s key message to the Galatians is one of freedom in Christ, freedom from the bondage of the law and the flesh.¹⁸

Though in a different manner from the Galatians, the Corinthians also fail to do justice to their new faith because they revert to their Gentile heritage. Some of the members of the congregation are extending their Greco-Roman socio-political practices by aligning with certain members of the early Christian community,¹⁹ and some have even adopted aspects of the “sexual license” that had made Corinth infamous.²⁰ In light of these abuses and other issues at Corinth—related to marriage,²¹ eating meat sacrificed to idols,²² and liturgical issues²³—Paul goes on in successive sections to lay out ethical guidelines for the Corinthians to follow for each case. Through an analysis of the historical context of the communities to whom Paul was writing, his reasons for proclaiming spiritual freedom to the Galatians while constructing ethical guidelines for the Corinthians become clearly situation based.

Though the seemingly contradicting messages of these letters can be explained in relation to the surrounding contexts and situations in which and for which they were written, such an explanation does not vindicate or unify Paul’s message in light of the theological basis from which he must have worked. It does explain why these letters seem to contradict however, it does not unify them. A unifying link between these two letters can be found in the factionalizing that was taking place at Corinth and theologically in Paul’s conception of what it means to be a follower of Christ, as illustrated in the Corinthian scenario of being spiritually free to eat meat sacrificed to idols in light of the disturbance it caused within the community.²⁴ This unifying message is of spiritual freedom based

¹⁶ Barr, *New Testament Story*, 24–29.

¹⁷ Gal 4:8–11.

¹⁸ Gal 2:16; 5:1

¹⁹ 1 Cor 1:11–13.

²⁰ 1 Cor 5: 1–5.

²¹ 1 Cor 7.

²² 1 Cor 8.

²³ 1 Cor 11.

²⁴ 1 Cor 8:1–11.

in faith, though this freedom ends with one's responsibility for the Christian community, as based on Paul's Greco-Roman understanding of the body.

In 1 Corinthians 1-3 Paul rebukes the Corinthians for abiding by "fleshy wisdom" over "spiritual wisdom" in response to their divisive Greco-Roman behavior of claiming sides according to the rhetoric and philosophy of particular Christian ministers.²⁵ It is here that Paul's message can possibly be unified between the two letters. According to Raymond Collins, Paul's use of the Greek word *sarx*, meaning flesh, actually has the connotation of weakness in the Pauline corpus. So in this passage Paul uses it to indicate to the Corinthians that they are carnal people, giving in to the weaknesses of the flesh.²⁶ The Galatians were rebuked by Paul for a similar transgression. They accepted the "fleshy" bondage of the law over the spiritual freedom offered through faith in Christ.²⁷ This is the connection between the letters.

The Corinthians were, like the Galatians in their acceptance of the law, interpreting this freedom in terms of "fleshy" desires. They understood their freedom on the wrong level as it is hard to understand and paradoxical to humans.²⁸ In faith in the Cross a man or a woman is not free to do what he or she wants, "For you were called to freedom, brothers and sisters; only do not allow freedom to be turned into a military base of operations for the flesh active as a cosmic power. On the contrary, through love be genuine servants of one another."²⁹ As the Galatians perverted Paul's message through acceptance of the "fleshy" bondage of the Law, in all its Gentile familiarity with its relationship to achieving accord with the Fates through just action, the Corinthians have perverted Paul's message of spiritual freedom by attributing it to the flesh (1 Cor 1:11-13, 5:1-5).³⁰ As laid out by Louis Martin,

Gal 5:13-24 is not a prescription of the way the Galatians ought to behave, a series of exhortations focused on the demands laid on human beings by the Law or by some other system of moral norms. On the contrary, this paragraph is fundamentally a

²⁵ 1 Cor 3:5; 4:4.

²⁶ Raymond Collins, *First Corinthians* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1999), 140.

²⁷ Gal 3:2-3.

²⁸ 1 Cor 1:18-25.

²⁹ J. Louis Martin, *Galatians* (New York: Doubleday, 1997), 479.

³⁰ 1 Cor 1:11-13; 5:1-5.

description of the way things are, given the advent of the Spirit, its declaration of war against the Flesh, and its community building power already evident in the Galatian churches.³¹

So then, why does Paul seemingly lay out for the Corinthians a code of ethics? Based on the evidence reported by his associates, Paul had deemed that the Corinthians were still “fleshly people.” In turn, he has been forced to spell out the rules to them until they become mature in faith so that then they too may experience freedom of the Spirit as known through “Spiritual Wisdom”—their factionalizing is cited to them as evidence of their youth in faith.³² However, it is possible that Paul’s constraints on spiritual freedom go beyond this arbitrary explanation to the “infant Corinthians.” In light of our spiritual freedom we are still responsible for its effect on others’ conscience; our actions should be limited to what is understandable to our brothers and sisters in Christ such that unity is preserved.³³ Paul even details instances where he has restrained his freedom within his life, in 1 Corinthians 9:1-27, to drive this point home.³⁴

Further, this can be attributed to Paul’s use of the body as a metaphor for community. In *First Corinthians*, Paul uses the Greek word *sōma* because he “intends to speak of the unity of the body and of the diversity of several members as well as the interrelationships between the one and the many.” This word has classical literary usages as such.³⁵ In addition, according to this conception of the community as a body, any disunity can be deemed to be a sickness and looked down upon.³⁶ It is according to such a conception that Paul checks freedom. This is also his reason for writing to the Corinthians to urge unity.³⁷ The Corinthians, apparently, have not been as successful as their Galatian counterparts in their “advent of the Spirit, its declaration of war against the Flesh, and its community building power already evident in the Galatian churches.”³⁸

³¹ Martin, *Galatians*, 484.

³² 1 Cor 3:1-3.

³³ 1 Cor 8: 11–12.

³⁴ Raymond E. Brown, et al., eds., *The New Jerome Biblical Commentary* (Edgewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990), 806.

³⁵ Collins, 458.

³⁶ Barr, *New Testament Story*, 134.

³⁷ 1 Cor 1:10.

³⁸ Martin, *Galatians*, 484.

The differences between Paul's letter to the Galatians and his first letter to the Corinthians can be attributed to the context of those communities. Each letter is crafted to address those contextual needs. These differences can be rectified theologically by understanding Paul's Greco-Roman conception of the body and its use as a metaphor for the Christian community. From this it can be deduced that through faith in Christ crucified one becomes in a right relationship with God and therefore is free from the Law.³⁹ This freedom however, is a spiritual freedom; it does not extend to the flesh. We are free from the "war of the flesh"⁴⁰ through living this imitation of the crucifixion daily.⁴¹ However, even this spiritual freedom finds constraint from Paul. One is free only until the Other is involved. We are responsible for the conscious of others and, therefore, the community as a whole.⁴² If our actions are misunderstood and are causing division, then we owe it to unity in Christ to limit ourselves to the understanding of others.⁴³

³⁹ Gal 2:16; 5:1.

⁴⁰ Martin, *Galatians*, 484.

⁴¹ Gal 5:13.

⁴² 1 Cor 8: 9–12.

⁴³ 1 Cor 9:27.

Why Read Poetry?

Andrew Calis

Andrew Calis is recent graduate of Mount St. Mary's, where he majored in English and minored in philosophy. He hopes to get a master's degree in English with a focus in poetry before eventually earning a Ph.D. His goal is to one day return and teach at the Mount.

This paper considers literature, especially poetry, and its relationship to the central ethical question, “How should we live?” It argues that poetry is a helpful tool in improving one’s moral outlook in the same way that novels are essential; that literature provides a more personal, experiential, and specific model of morality than that of overarching philosophical texts. Although works of philosophy may be more exact and well-structured, they are also much more abstract, which makes them feel cold and impersonal, distancing themselves from the reader. Literature, on the other hand, by its personal involvement of the reader, can move the reader in a way that philosophy cannot. This paper also addresses the difference between poetry and the novel in relation to ethics. I will argue that they approach ethical questions in an importantly distinct *form* while still discussing similar *content*. While both poetry and the novel address similar content, their forms make them decidedly distinct: for example, when poetry provides moral guidelines, it is often at most a few pages, while novels have hundreds of pages to make their points; poets cannot hope to detail characters in the same way as novelists can; poems cannot offer as detailed situations, or as many multifarious examples of morality being displayed. Like in the case of novels, the experience of learning is enjoyable. But like philosophy, poetry, whose *philosophical* purpose is not to provide multiple examples of morality, must give some sort of “umbrella morality,” which shows the moral way one should live through generality, providing the reader with an outlook rather than a codifiable doctrine. Thus, while poetry might not be immediately and obviously a moral tool, we see how it can be used to improve

readers' abilities to recognize and respond to complex moral situations.

Because poetry is concerned with the question of how one should live, it has an inherent, but not necessarily a primary, ethical aspect. While many authors argue that there is a gap between the fields of philosophy and literature, it is impossible to ignore the many places where these two overlap. Anthony LeBranche lists many of these shared themes in his essay *How Is Poetry Philosophical?* He begins by listing the similarities these disciplines share:

Both poetry and philosophy propose, then modify, statements of our relations to the world. Both disciplines use a variety of definitions in order to solidify their stance before concerns which it might benefit us also to contemplate. . . . Both disciplines reveal their thoughtful drift toward a final position, toward a definition of or a settling into a difficult or elusive insight. In order to accomplish this, both may resort to argumentative postures of paradox and ambiguity. . . . In both poetry and philosophy, matters are not to be taken at a first glance. We work into things snakily, sensitively, autobiographically.¹

LeBranche notes the similarities between these fields: they show us important features about how we interact with the world; both make language and definitions very important; and both require continued efforts to understand their ideas fully. By this description, it is important to note the focus on the lack of clarity. Whether the objective of philosophy or literature is “difficult or elusive” or has “paradox and ambiguity,” what is important is that we should not assume that matters will be perfectly clear from the start. Even though it is philosophy’s objective to provide some sort of structural method or answer, this is not always immediately apparent. It often takes effort to discover truly what a philosopher is saying. With literature, this ambiguity is often intentional, to evoke in the reader a feeling of being unsure, to emphasize that in life, very few decisions have an obvious, certain answer.

¹ Anthony LaBranche, “How Is Poetry Philosophical?” in *Literature as Philosophy/Philosophy as Literature*, ed. Donald G. Marshall (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1987), 4.

Despite the similarities that link philosophy and literature, it is their differences that make them distinct. At first read, poetry is engaging, involving the participation of the reader and linking her inextricably to the content of the poetry. There is something inherently personal about poetry, and the reader often identifies with the text she is reading. Arthur Danto emphasizes this in his essay *Philosophy as/and/of Literature*: “We realize that more is involved even in contemporary analytical philosophy than merely stating the truth: to get at that kind of truth involves some kind of transformation of the audience.”² By this, Danto says that an impersonal truth should not be the sole purpose of philosophy; but literature offers the personal transformation that Danto expresses a need for. This allows philosophy and literature to overlap in poetry, so that a truth is discovered, and this truth is transformative and personal. When engaged in a poem, the reader is “identifying himself not with the implied reader for whom the implied narrator writes but with the actual subject of the text in such a way that each work becomes a metaphor for each reader.”³ Contrast this personal, engaged way of approaching literature to the colder, less personal texts of philosophy.

The most important difference between philosophy and literature, however, is in what they provide for the reader. In the ethical realm, philosophy provides codifiable formulations, repeatable and teachable. Literature cannot promise the same exact, rigid structure. The most it can, and does, provide is an outlook on life. John McDowell argues in *Virtue and Reason* that having an important ethical outlook is essential to morality. This is because generalizations, like laws, will inevitably fail. However, people have a natural prejudice against anything uncodifiable. This makes general laws preferred, even though these laws will, in certain particular cases, fail. As McDowell says,

The best generalizations about how one should behave hold only for the most part. If one attempted to reduce one’s conception of what virtue requires to a set of rules, then, however subtle and thoughtful one was in drawing up the code, cases would inevitably turn up in which a

² Arthur C. Danto, “Philosophy as/and/of Literature” in *Literature and the Question of Philosophy*, ed. Anthony J. Cascardi (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 7.

³ *Ibid.*, 18.

mechanical application of the rules would strike one as wrong.⁴

This shows why literature is increasingly important. Literature, through examples, shows various situations where rules would come into question. Literature is full of difficult moral dilemmas that could not be solved by a universal rule. A novel, for example, does not state the proper way to live in a codifiable formulation. As Martha Nussbaum puts it in *Love's Knowledge*, novels display before us a wealth of richly realized detail, presented as relevant for choice. And yet they speak to us: they ask us to imagine possible relations between our own situations and those of the protagonists, to identify with the characters and/or the situation, thereby perceiving those similarities and differences. In this way their structure suggests, as well, that much of moral relevance is universalizable.⁵

Even though the sharpening of a readers' moral vision through literature is not foolproof methods to guarantee the right moral decision in every situation, it still has great credibility. Literature does not merely offer guidelines, or rules to follow: it presents true situations, moral dilemmas, and experiences that many will never have had the chance to encounter otherwise. It shows a difficult situation, and shows how characters react. From this, readers learn to recognize moral situations as well as various ways to deal with them. As McDowell argues, human beings tend to have a prejudice against whatever is not codifiable, and this often means distrusting something potentially morally beneficial, which can be, for example, the outlook novels or poetry provides.⁶ But because codifiable rules can fail in particular situations, McDowell wants to show the flaw in this prejudice: "Occasion by occasion, one knows what to do (if one does) not by applying universal principles but by being a certain kind of person: one who sees situations in a certain distinctive way."⁷ Because generalized principles fail in particular situations, McDowell wants an ethical outlook that frames the way

⁴ Ibid., 93.

⁵ Ibid., 94.

⁶ John McDowell, "Virtue and Reason" in *Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism*, ed. Stanley G. Clarke and Evan Simpson (New York: State University of New York Press, 1989), 93.

⁷ Ibid., 105.

we see particular situations; this seems to be the exact sort of thing that novels and poetry can offer.

Because both novels and works of poetry provide ethical outlooks, there must be some important difference in their approach beyond their mission. The difference lies in the form, not the content, of these two literary genres. The novel, as Nussbaum said earlier, offers readers with rich detail, developed characters and multiple occasions to observe specific examples of morality. Because of their length, novels can show the moral development of its characters. Poetry, however, cannot do this because of its limited space. Therefore, poetry's approach is to show a glimpse of life that highlights a way of seeing the world. These features are very general; examples might be that, in a brief poem that mourns a death the outlook is that one ought to celebrate the life they have, seeing as it is ephemeral; or that in a poem that rejoices in a birth, the reader might observe how this leads to wonderment at God's creation. In these examples, what actually occurs in the work is not primarily morally pertinent; it is how the reader draws an ethical outlook from the poem that has ethical significance. The morality suggested by poetry differs from philosophy in that, even though I might be able to "codify" the ethics expressed in certain poems, without actually reading the work, without actually experiencing the artfulness and carefully crafted situation an author puts her readers in, all one has is a cold, impersonal rule, not extremely dissimilar to what a moral philosopher might offer.

T.S. Eliot provides an example of an ethical outlook that can be gained from his poem, "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock." In a poem focused on the physical appearance of the protagonist and on others' opinions of him, readers can observe how deeply distraught Prufrock is because of his concern with what others think of him. The mood of the poem is somber and serious, and it places undue weight on trivial events. The title itself is somewhat ponderous in its tone, even though its subject should be light and joyous, seeing as it is a love song; however, because it is a love song "of J. Alfred Prufrock," this added name implies seriousness in the formal mentioning of what is a very solemn-sounding address. Readers have a rather weighty and sober title followed by the first lines, complete with the image of a numbed patient on a table.

The analogy of the night sky being like a "patient etherized upon a table" shows how Prufrock perceives something potentially beautiful (the evening sky) as somber and serious; it also acts as a

symbol for his inability to take action (line 3). The undue importance Prufrock places on his unasked question is so intense that it even prevents him from sharing it with his readers, and we are left to speculate on what it might be. He is a character who, at the expense of happiness, takes ordinary things too seriously. In his description of getting ready, he speaks of “prepar[ing] a face to meet the faces that you meet,” which he compares to the act of murdering (l. 28). His distress is intensified when he considers his appearance: “With a bald spot in the middle of my hair—(they will say: ‘How his hair is growing thin!’)”; his tie is unbecoming because, of all things, its pin is too simple; his physique is gaunt enough that he fears unwanted attention (ll. 40-43). His self-consciousness evokes either pity or scorn from the reader: when considering his question, it undergoes multiple revisions, because he fears this question is potent enough to “disturb the universe.”⁸

Prufrock’s tendency to exaggerate the importance of each minor decision progressively grows until it reaches the point of being unbearable. He begins comparing himself to tragic heroes: John the Baptist is referenced, but this time the head is “grown slightly bald” to resemble that of the speaker; he admits that he is no Lazarus, who has something great to say; finally, he confesses that he is no Prince Hamlet (who, interestingly, is a character much like Prufrock that seems to perceive a situation as worse than it actually is), and that he himself is ridiculous, “Almost, at times, the Fool” (82; 94; 111; 119). Finally, his situation is perceived in such a flawed fashion that, as the last lines pronounce, “Human voices wake us, and we drown” (131). Prufrock finds himself so overwhelmed when he snaps out of his imaginings, he experiences reality as drowning and death. This is the most misconstrued event that Prufrock perceives: that life is actually death.

Prufrock’s inability to properly perceive the situation he is in results in a miserable life. This exemplifies what McDowell stressed earlier: “Occasion by occasion, one knows what to do (if one does) not by applying universal principles but by being a certain kind of person: one who sees situations in a certain distinctive way.”⁹ The ethical philosophy behind “Love Song” resounds with McDowell’s advice. Prufrock has the potential to be a satisfied character, because the things that haunt him are essentially superficial and unimportant.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 46.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 105.

No actual event in the poem should have ruined a morally sound person. It boils down to how Prufrock perceives his situation; and because he perceives it poorly, placing undue weight on essentially unimportant things, he becomes so overwhelmed that he dies when awakened to life. He becomes the exact opposite of Lazarus, who rose to help when he was summoned.

The outlook Eliot provides can be applied to the reader. Because it is universalizable, one can use it when considering a number of particular situations. It is not a rule or system but, instead, a way of viewing a situation. This allows for its application in any situation without the conflicts that a specific rule might encounter with varied situations. To state it as a rule would be difficult: should it state that one should not take him- or herself too seriously? Or that dinner parties that result in a sense of being ostracized should be avoided? The poem does not try to make a rule out of Prufrock's situation, but only to call attention to how he perceived his situation. It sharpens the readers' moral vision, but without providing them a specific rule to follow.

This is what LaBranche has in mind when he says that an important contribution to the success of poetry is that its content is often universalizable.¹⁰ When these poems include moral outlooks, like in Eliot's case, poetry succeeds in being a moral device. It trains one to see the world in a certain way. In this, it sensitizes our moral vision. Thus, our vision is sharpened by recognizing where Prufrock's vision is imperfect. Nussbaum says that it is essential that a moral agent have a universalizable outlook, because "the good agent may need not only to locate the virtuous action among strange new events, but also to deal with an evolving and situation-relative list of virtues."¹¹ Without such an outlook, as McDowell points out, any set of rules that governed the situation would eventually fail. Imagine the rearing of a child, to use Nussbaum's example.¹² A child cannot be taught a rule to go with every possible situation, because humans lack the foresight to predict what might be a moral dilemma. So instead, we provide guidelines or an outlook that the child can adhere to; this way, the child can be prepared for situations that involve some new element with which she is unfamiliar. McDowell says that, to react to a new moral dilemma, there must be as

¹⁰ "How Is Poetry Philosophical?" 10.

¹¹ Martha C. Nussbaum, *Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 71.

¹² *Ibid.*, 67.

“interaction between this universal knowledge and some appropriate piece of particular knowledge about the situation at hand.”¹³ The role of “outlook provider” is satisfied by literature, especially through poetry, as shown by “The Love Song”; but literature also provides us with “some appropriate piece of particular knowledge” by introducing us to situations where we likely would not find ourselves otherwise. This additional experience can serve us well in making decisions about situations with which we would be otherwise unfamiliar.

There is a sharp distinction between the function of philosophy and the function of literature, each having its own limitations. Philosophy is able to provide well-reasoned truths, but it almost always lacks “the particularity, the emotive appeal, the absorbing plottedness, the variety and indeterminacy, of good fiction; [it lacks], too, good fiction’s way of making the reader a participant and a friend.”¹⁴ Carl Rapp, in “Philosophy and Poetry,” points out poetry’s deficiency: “Poetry may not be capable of determining the truth from scratch, so to speak, but it is capable of presenting for contemplation certain general truths having to do with human nature and behavior.”¹⁵ So, while both are lacking in some sense, they help to fill each other’s voids.

There are some, however, who would argue that either discipline can stand on its own. Henry Geiger, in fact, argues that, in modern society, philosophy is more important than we admit. Because of the influence literature has had on philosophical discussion, he says that many ordinary people are drawn away from the highly intellectual world of philosophy, and would prefer to discover philosophy through literature, which is much more accessible. The problem, he says, is that “quite evidently, only those who attempt to philosophize have enlightening things to say about being human.”¹⁶ Therefore, a writer attempting to write a novel, unless writing with the explicit intent of philosophizing, is contributing very little to philosophical discussion. This statement is easily the cause of great disagreement. I would argue that a work is

¹³ “Virtue and Reason,” 92.

¹⁴ *Love’s Knowledge*, 46.

¹⁵ Carl Rapp, “Philosophy and Poetry: The New Rapprochement,” in *Literature as Philosophy/Philosophy as Literature*, ed. Donald G. Marshall. (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1987), 123.

¹⁶ Henry Geiger, “Is Philosophy Important?” *Manas Journal* (10 May 1967), http://www.manasjournal.org/pdf_library/VolumeXX_1967/XX-19.pdf.

philosophical so long as it expresses an improving way to view the world, such as an improved moral vision. Geiger says elsewhere that “philosophical thinking has impact whenever the thrust of a seriously deliberated human attitude is felt.”¹⁷ Literature is a prime place for this to occur. By limiting philosophical discussion to explicitly philosophical texts, Geiger is being excessively constrictive, especially when a poem or novel can provide readers with an outlook as opposed to a principle.

Maurice Nantanson attempts a different kind of restriction on the role of philosophy in literature. He says that “Philosophy arises in literature when the question raised is that of Being.”¹⁸ While this is less restrictive than Geiger, this still limits the role of philosophy to mere ontology. This does not credit the philosophical aspect of having an ethical outlook. An outlook is not concerned with Being as much as it is concerned with acting. By limiting the role of philosophy, Nantanson leaves a void in the role a moral outlook plays. It is apparent, and shown by an example earlier in this paper, that an ethical point of view can be communicated through literature. Nantanson’s statement does not provide any reason to discredit literature’s ability to provide an improved moral outlook.

Despite these arguments against the overlap between philosophy and literature, it becomes clear that these two disciplines complement each other well. Nussbaum relies heavily on the role of literature in her philosophical arguments: “My aim is to establish that certain literary texts (or texts similar to these in certain relevant ways) are indispensable to a philosophical inquiry in the ethical sphere: not by any means sufficient, but sources of insights without which the inquiry cannot be complete.”¹⁹ By showing that literature is not a substitute for philosophy, but rather a complement to it, Nussbaum is reconciling these two disciplines. She does not place more philosophical value on one or the other, thus allowing them to work together harmoniously. This compromise encourages a broader, more expansive philosophical discussion that would not be possible if either discipline were absent.

After considering the role of poetry and novels as complements to philosophy, it is evident that literature is an important tool for ethical thought: it provides an outlook on life

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Maurice Nantanson, *Literature, Philosophy, and the Social Sciences: Essays in Existentialism and Phenomenology* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), 87.

¹⁹ *Love’s Knowledge*, 23–24.

instead of a series of codifiable principles. This outlook allows for flexibility in the particular moral situation in a way that rules cannot and in a way that is true to our ethical experiences. By connecting on a personal level with its readers, literature encourages individual investment into the ideas of the text. Philosophy offers the groundwork, but literature provides the much-needed and aesthetically inviting aspect of ethical discovery. While rules promise assurance, these almost inevitably will fail when encountering an unfamiliar moral experience. Literature, however, improves the readers' ability to respond to moral situations by improving their moral vision. In this way, literature is a great complement to philosophy, and should be viewed as its companion and friend.

Return to Natural Law: Justifying the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention

Micaela Harrison

In the last two decades, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has become one of the most controversial concepts in the field of international relations. The debate surrounding the legality of humanitarian intervention is centered on a fundamental disagreement about legitimate sources of law. For the states and scholars who give dominance to positive sources of law, humanitarian intervention is a violation of state sovereignty not permitted under international law. In contrast, natural law theorists contend that natural law should take precedence over positive law when it is necessary to stop and eliminate further atrocities; as such, humanitarian intervention is permitted to bring an end to massive human rights abuses. Despite the popularity and prevailing view of positivism with respect to international law, I will argue that natural law theory is a legitimate source of law that is not only recognized within the international legal sphere, but also justifies the legality of humanitarian intervention.

Current legal debates about humanitarian intervention typically begin and end with the Charter of the United Nations, which was established in 1945 with the end of the Second World War.¹ In an attempt to secure peace among nations, the Charter imposed limitations upon the use of force among sovereign states. The contemporary conception of sovereignty was formed by agreements signed by European states in the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648.² The theory of Westphalia presents the legal identity of a state as drawn from the idea of sovereignty allowing the state to “exercise total and exclusive jurisdiction within its territorial borders.”³ The doctrine of non-intervention in domestic jurisdiction

¹ Richard Falk, “The Complexities of Humanitarian Intervention: A New World Order Challenge,” *Michigan Journal of International Law* 17 (1996): 494.

² John Charvet, “The Idea of Sovereignty and the Right of Humanitarian Intervention,” *International Political Science Review* 18 (1997): 40.

³ *Ibid.*

of other states is a fundamental principle of international law and can be seen as reflecting the principle of sovereignty because “sovereign states are obliged to respect the sovereignty of all other states.”⁴

The U.N. Charter extended the doctrine of non-intervention to all states and made it a universal norm for the first time in history.⁵ Article 2(4) states, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”⁶ The respect of sovereignty is reiterated again in Article 2(7) of the Charter, which states, “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”⁷ Additionally, it allowed the use of force only in cases of self-defense or collective security measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.⁸ This section of the Charter allows the Security Council to circumvent the notion of state sovereignty where it takes measures in response to “a threat to peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression.”⁹ Consequently, it left the threat of international peace and security as the only possible justification for intervention in the domestic affairs of a state. Furthermore, all acts of intervention were to be subject to authorization of the United Nations, acting as the representative of the international community.¹⁰

Along with the emergence of non-intervention as a universal norm, a simultaneous development of a U.N. initiative was in conflict with this principle: the development of human rights as a global issue. Before 1945, human rights were viewed as internal affairs of states.¹¹ While the U.N. Charter does not contain any specific human rights obligations, it does not remain completely silent on this topic. Article 1(3) of the Charter asserts that the purpose of the United Nations is “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Patrick Macklem, “Humanitarian Intervention and the Distribution of Sovereignty in International Law,” *Ethics & International Affairs* 22 (2008): 376.

⁶ “Charter of the United Nations,” Article 2(4), United Nations, <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>.

⁷ Ibid., Article 2(7).

⁸ Ibid., Article 51.

⁹ Ibid., Article 39.

¹⁰ Macklem, “Humanitarian Intervention,” 377.

¹¹ Charvet, “The Idea of Sovereignty,” 42.

without distinction to race, sex, language, or religion.”¹² Article 55 of the Charter commits the U.N. to “promote . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms.”¹³ Article 56 of the Charter is also considered a human rights provision, pledging all members “to take joint and separate action” toward this end.¹⁴ Humanitarian intervention, as the most assertive form of promoting human rights at a global level, was clearly incompatible with the principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty.

According to J. L. Holzgrefe, a Visiting Research Scholar in the Department of Political Science at Duke University, humanitarian intervention is defined as “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or a group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.”¹⁵ The literature on humanitarian intervention is vast, and the practice of intervention to “help the innocent” has a substantial history. Interventions in the name of humanity must be understood in the normative context in which they occur, as well as with respect to legal perspectives. Positivism and natural law theory are generally the most common approaches to international law. Natural law persisted as the basis for reasoning on the legitimate use of force (“Just War” theory) until the Treaty of Westphalia, which produced the long-term effect of putting positive law before natural law.¹⁶ Whereas natural law is based on moral reasoning, positive law in the international sphere is based on political reasoning. Today, the point of interest for the debate on humanitarian intervention is the tension between state sovereignty and individual human rights that is embodied in the pinnacle of positive international law—the U.N. Charter.

Positivists observe the principle that actions of state power, which are displayed in a body of rules and judgments laid down by the state, are the only legitimate sources of law.¹⁷ For positivists,

¹² U.N. Charter, Article 1(3).

¹³ *Ibid.*, Article 55.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Article 56.

¹⁵ J. L. Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” in *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas*, ed. J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 18.

¹⁶ Macklem, “Humanitarian Intervention and the Distribution of Sovereignty,” 376.

¹⁷ Benedict Kingsbury, “Legal Positivism as Normative Politics: International Society, Balance of Power and Positive International Law,” *European Journal of International Law* 13 (2002), 309.

these rules operate “independently of principles of right and wrong and independently of the history or social consciousness of the given polity.”¹⁸ States enact rules solely to serve their own self-interest and will amend such rules when the current system no longer serves the ends of the state. As a result, the positivist school of thought identifies law with the lawmaker. Positivism resonates with the “realist” perspective in international relations which views all state action as an attempt to further national self-interests using state power.¹⁹ Positivists maintain that the only validating sources of actions are enacted law and legal judgments.

It has been claimed that the first international legal positivist may have been John Austin, who attacked the existence of international law as “law” and focused on the “fact” of obedience to a superior sovereign.²⁰ His criticisms did away with “two of the core ideas that had shaped international law from its inception at the time of the birth of the modern state: natural law and the theory of the just war.”²¹ In “The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence,” Austin defines law as nothing more or less than the enforced command of a sovereign to a subject. He outlines the nature of sovereignty as being habitually obeyed by others, not obeying any higher authority, and having unlimited power.²² Because international society lacks an overarching sovereign, it is impossible to create international law. Additionally, Austin claims the power of the sovereign is not limited by justice or any ideas of good and bad, right or wrong. “The existence of the law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another.”²³ In this view, the validity of a law has nothing to do with what morality may require or prohibit. Therefore, according to Austin, law is nothing more than the command of a sovereign who is habitually obeyed by his subjects.

Applying the positivist perspective to humanitarian law, it becomes apparent that current positive international law outlaws humanitarian intervention that is not authorized by the United

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., 318.

²¹ Ibid.

²² John Austin, “The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence,” in *The Philosophy of Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings with Commentary*, ed. Frederick Schauer and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace, 1996), 34.

²³ Austin, “The Province of Jurisprudence,” 37.

Nations. After the rise of positivism in the nineteenth century, legal scholars developed the theory of non-intervention as the primary foundation for international law regulating the use of force.²⁴ This concept was made evident in consecutive international agreements drafted after World War II which condemned intervention. For example, under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, Member States must “refrain . . . from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”²⁵ Similarly, Article 2(7) indicated that no state may “intervene in matters which are essentially within domestic jurisdiction of any state.”²⁶ These requirements were interpreted to mean that sovereignty and territorial integrity were to be valued above all else. As a result, positivist scholars, relying solely on the U.N. Charter, have determined that humanitarian intervention was made illegal because “it is radically contrary to Article 2(4) . . . and no [positive] precedent supporting the opposite view can be quoted.”²⁷

International agreements ratified after the U.N. Charter supported this notion of legality. For example, the U.N. General Assembly stated in Resolution 2625 in 1970, and again in Resolution 36/103 in 1981, that no state “has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, *for any reason whatever*, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.”²⁸ Similar expressions of non-intervention were also articulated in the Geneva Protocols, which were adopted in 1977.²⁹ These documents make it clear that positive law ratified since the passage of the Charter prohibits interventions that are not supported by the U.N. Additionally, positivists also point to the rules laid down by international tribunals as proof of the illegality of intervention. In *Nicaragua v. United States*, for example, the International Court of Justice was called upon to decide whether Article 51 Charter, which limits the use of force to self-defense and collective security, authorized the actions of the United States.³⁰ After the overthrow of the Nicaraguan president, the United States placed underwater mines in the country for Central Intelligence Agency operatives, in addition

²⁴ Kingsbury, “Legal Positivism as Normative Politics,” 321.

²⁵ U.N. Charter, Article 2(4).

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Article 2(7).

²⁷ Charvet, “The Idea of Sovereignty,” 45.

²⁸ Mohammad Ayoob, “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty,” *International Journal of Human Rights* 6 (2002): 92.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 95.

to training, funding, and supporting to the rebel forces in the country.³¹ In finding the United States' Article 51 "collective self-defense" argument unconvincing, the International Court of Justice concluded that "the argument derived from the preservation of human rights in Nicaragua cannot afford a legal justification for the conduct of the United States."³² Scholars have determined that this ruling constitutes another source of positive law that makes intervention illegal. Furthermore, advocates of this perspective include not only a majority of legal scholars, but also many states. For example, in reaction to India's intervention in East Pakistan in 1971, Sweden rested its condemnation on the positivist view that "the Charter of the United Nations . . . forbids the use of force except in self-defense . . . and no other purpose can justify the use of military force by states."³³

Due to the consistency in positive international law outlawing humanitarian intervention since the U.N. Charter, the positivist position would be favorable if positive sources were the only sources that could justify action. However, there are several weaknesses with the positivist view, which suggests that other sources should be referred to while attempting to determine what the law is. Despite the appeal of positive arguments based on transparent, written international rules, "law" is more than a set of rules governing social behavior."³⁴ Laws represent an articulation of the values and social beliefs of a community. And in this way, what the law "is" transcends the written letter of the law. Therefore, positivist arguments alone cannot claim to explain what the law of intervention "is" in any definitive sense.

First of all, international law specifically recognizes sources of law not contained in positive law. According to the statute creating the International Court of Justice, legitimate sources of international law include not only conventions establishing rules, but also "international custom, general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, judicial decisions, and the writings of legal scholars."³⁵ In addition, the legality of actions in international law

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid., 96.

³⁴ Jonathan I. Charney, "Universal International Law," *The American Journal of International Law* 87 (1993): 534.

³⁵ Anne-Marie Slaughter, "International Law in a World of Liberal States," *European Journal of International Law* 6 (1995), 519.

may also be decided “*ex aequo et bono* (by what is equal and good),” which allows natural law and justice to inform legality.³⁶ Article 38 of the International Court of Justice Statute has been widely accepted as authoritative in determining which sources of international law are legitimate; this article reads: “most treatises and casebooks on international law agree on the standard ‘sources’ of international law (treatises, state practice, general principles, judicial decisions, and the views of scholars).”³⁷ Therefore, the positivist position which claims that ratified law is the only source of law to determine the legality of intervention breaches this statute.

Secondly, one could take issue with the positivist position for its failure to account for state and U.N. practice. Despite the fact that positivists argue the U.N. Charter is a clear restriction of intervention, states have still continued to make use of humanitarian intervention without support of the U.N. for “purely humanitarian reasons, for strategic reasons, or for a mix of both.”³⁸ Therefore, there is no agreement among states that they must obey an absolute ban of intervention. In addition, the United Nations has not condemned all of the interventions that have occurred since the enactment of the Charter. The inconsistency between positive law and state and U.N. practice undermines the positivist belief that what the law “is” with regard to intervention is restricted to the limitations of Article 2(4): “All Members shall refrain . . . from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or independence of any state.”³⁹ The recurrence of humanitarian interventions on behalf of states lacking the authorization of the U.N. contradicts the positivist dependence on enacted law and legal judgments.

Thirdly, the positivist position can be attacked because of the inability of the Security Council to consistently control state behavior. Because positivists look for legality solely in enacted law, the only means by which an intervention can be authorized is through a Chapter VII enforcement action ordered by the Security Council in response to “a threat to peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression.”⁴⁰ However, as several scholars have pointed out, the veto power of the permanent members often leaves the Security

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ International Court of Justice, *Statute of the International Criminal Court*, Article 38, <http://www.icpj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4/>.

³⁸ Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” 23.

³⁹ U.N. Charter, Article 2(4).

⁴⁰ Ibid., Article 39.

Council incompetent in the face of atrocities because opposition to intervention by one or more of the permanent members can prevent any Chapter VII action.⁴¹ For example, because both Russia and China specified that they would veto any proposal that called for intervention in Kosovo in 1999 due to massive human rights abuses, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization chose to act unilaterally to limit human rights atrocities being committed in the country.⁴² Based on this dynamic, scholars have argued that a strict positivist position is unacceptable and intervention should be allowed as an “emergency mechanism” which can be employed when the Security Council is incapable of acting.⁴³

Because of these weaknesses, the positivist position cannot alone determine the legality of intervention. In addition to these reasonable criticisms, there is also a group of scholars who find fault with the positivists on a more fundamental level. This group is composed of natural law theorists, who argue that a large gap in the positivist argument lies in its inability to account for the values and norms behind the U.N. Charter, as well as international law in general. Despite the current dominance of the positivist position, “a complete picture of the law on the use of force, including that of humanitarian intervention, cannot ignore the continuing relevance of natural law.”⁴⁴ Unlike positivism, natural law can account for and address the conflicting principles of sovereignty and respect for human rights within the framework of international law.

Natural law theorists treat “law” as the embodiment of norms and values. Natural law emphasizes that these norms and values are universal principles which come from “right reason” and the “conscience collectivity held by humanity.”⁴⁵ Guided by these principles, states are supposed to enact and follow rules in accordance with these universal norms and values. Therefore, what the law “is” according to natural law theorists is determined by what the law ‘ought to be’ according to a universal value system. For the natural law supporter, the concept of law implies that rules must be analyzed, interpreted, and applied in accordance with the moral purposes for which they exist. Consequently, “it is a tenet of natural-

⁴¹ Erik Voeten, “The Political Origins of the U.N. Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force,” *International Organization* 59 (2005): 541.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 543.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Charney, “Universal International Law,” 536.

⁴⁵ Slaughter, “International Law,” 522.

law theory that governmental acts or commands that grossly contravene fundamental principles of justice do not deserve to be called law at all.”⁴⁶ As a result, the main sources of law for natural law theorists are the values and norms derived from reason, “to which positive law must be subordinate.”⁴⁷

According to Thomas Aquinas, law is a rule or measure; eternal law is a rule or measure that is a part of nature, by which things derive their “respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends.”⁴⁸ Natural law is the manner in which human beings, as rational creatures, ‘participate’ in eternal law; by using their ability to be reflective and insightful, individuals can come to know their proper acts and ends, and by using their free will, individuals can order their lives accordingly. Law is not limited to the protection of individual rights; it “is chiefly ordained to the common good.”⁴⁹ Aquinas claims that natural law helps us to arrive at what is good and influences the sovereign in making justifiable laws aimed at the common good. In this sense, natural law serves both as “a guide to individual conduct and . . . as a standard for the laws enacted by the state.”⁵⁰ Historically, international law was first articulated by advocates of natural law theory, who provided the foundation of international law principles such as “the peaceful resolution of disputes, self-defense, and the right of humanitarian intervention.”⁵¹

Additionally, Aquinas worked on expanding the “just war” doctrine, which was originally developed and articulated by St. Augustine. The traditional version of this doctrine held that a Prince not only had a right, but even an obligation, to intervene in the territory of others if there were injustices that remained unchecked by the established authority.⁵² This right of intervention was closely tied to a concept notably articulated by Aquinas, *respublica Christiana*, which “assumed the unity of religious and political objectives of society.”⁵³ It was accepted that there were separate sovereignties, but at the same time, there was an order connecting these sovereignties

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 523.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Thomas Aquinas. “Summa Theologia,” in *The Philosophy of Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings with Commentary*, ed. Frederick Schauer and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1996), 12.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁵⁰ Charney, “Universal International Law,” 541.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*, 542.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

that produced its own rules and rights, and that, in turn, was derived of natural law.⁵⁴ Human beings had a sufficient ability of reason to identify the lasting principles that governed nature and humanity, which come from God. Therefore, humanitarian intervention essentially “amounted to an ‘Appeal to Heaven,’ or to Heaven’s Laws as they were interpreted through right reason.”⁵⁵

Beginning with the principle that human dignity and justice are undeniable, universal values which are derived from “right reason” and a sense of morality, advocates of the natural law perspective consider humanitarian intervention acceptable in certain circumstances.⁵⁶ The natural law argument supports the belief that humanitarian concerns can, at least in some cases, override the existing rules that would prohibit intervention absolutely. Building on the belief that positive law does not deserve to be respected when it violates fundamental principles, natural law theorists argue that a rule which absolutely prohibits intervention, such as Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which states, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,” cannot dictate human response in the face of mass genocide or other gross injustices. Therefore, “when there is an absence of a minimum moral order in a particular state, intervention is acceptable to re-establish the dominance of fundamental values.”⁵⁷

While the number of scholars developing natural law arguments has noticeably declined since the nineteenth century, a number of states continue to appeal to natural law principles as justification for unilateral or collective interventions that are not authorized by the United Nations.⁵⁸ For example, when Egyptian forces invaded Palestinian regions in the newly-independent state of Israel in 1948, the Egyptian government referred to the “horrible crimes, revolting to the conscience of humanity” as justification.⁵⁹ This justification was an appeal to a sense of duty to protect values, which came from a sense of morality, and represented a belief in natural law principles. In addition, the Tanzanian government declared that its intervention in Uganda in 1979 was legitimate

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 544.

⁵⁶ Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” 29.

⁵⁷ Macklem, “Human Intervention and the Distribution of Sovereignty,” 98.

⁵⁸ Charney, “Universal International Law,” 536.

⁵⁹ Ayoob, “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty,” 98.

because it sought to protect “freedom, justice, and human dignity.”⁶⁰ Furthermore, Germany argued that its participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was justified because its goal was to “defend human rights.”⁶¹ Therefore, despite the decline of natural law arguments being presented by scholars, states continue to refer to universal values as legitimate sources of law which justify intervention in certain circumstances.

In sum, supporters of the natural law perspective believe that certain norms and values—including fundamental human rights, human dignity, and justice—take precedence over the post-Westphalian belief that territorial sovereignty is supreme. In response to the positivist position, natural law theorists advise states to look to universal human values rather than attempting to “hide behind the formula of non-intervention when human rights are blatantly violated.”⁶² By recognizing the weaknesses of positive law to offer protection for fundamental human rights or to account for state practice, natural law theorists appeal to notions of humanity and justice to advocate for the legality of intervention.

The tension between these schools of thought has been played out in recent years both at the highest political levels and in state practice, and the natural law perspective has become the basis for significant positive international laws. Former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan intensified the debate over humanitarian intervention following the military operation in Kosovo in 1999, which has been considered to be the most controversial case of intervention to protect human rights that was not authorized by the United Nations.⁶³ He challenged governments to develop and come to agreement on guidelines for the use of force in the international sphere.⁶⁴ This challenge ultimately led to the publication of *The Responsibility to Protect* by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001, which emphasized that an intrinsic duty of state sovereignty is to protect the lives and rights of civilians.⁶⁵ The commission argued that if a state failed to uphold

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” 50.

⁶³ Alicia L. Bannon, “The Responsibility to Protect: The U.N. World Summit and the Question of Unilateralism,” *Yale Law Journal* 115 (2006): 1158.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

that duty, other governments have the right to act, which includes the use of military force as a last resort.⁶⁶

The Responsibility to Protect challenges the traditional positivist outlook of international law. The concepts in the report were derived from the natural law vision of an international rule of law centered on fundamental values. In this view, the safety and dignity of all individuals is the ultimate goal of both the sovereign state and the United Nations. If a state neglects its duties to its own citizens, the U.N. could use force to protect those citizens. Despite the reservations of many countries, the protection of human rights as a justification for intervention under certain circumstances has gained widespread acceptance.⁶⁷ In 2002, the U.N. Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change endorsed "the emerging norm that there is an international responsibility to protect . . . in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent."⁶⁸ At the September 2005 World Summit, the General Assembly of the United Nations approved the concept of the sovereign responsibility to protect civilians, including the use force as a last resort against states that do not live up to that responsibility.⁶⁹

The Responsibility to Protect is an important document within the context of this debate because it consciously attempts to take a new approach to humanitarian intervention by setting out clear ideas for reconciling conflicting principles of state sovereignty and respect for human rights. The study acknowledges that there has been a development of international norms that shape the backdrop of the debate. The report also articulates the weaknesses of relying solely on positive law for the justification of intervention by explaining that the changing international environment has generated "new expectations for action and new standards of conduct in national and international affairs" and that the current debate about intervention for human protection purposes "takes place in a historical, political, and legal context of evolving international standards of conduct for states and individuals, including the development of new and

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid, 1161.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

stronger norms and mechanisms for the protection of human rights.⁷⁰

The report articulates the influence of natural law and argues that a “modern” understanding of state sovereignty is evolving in the context of these changing norms: the world is moving from a post-Westphalian, territorial-based sovereignty—where those in power control sovereignty—to popular sovereignty, in the context of principles of the respect for human rights and solidarity. Accordingly,

sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally, to respect the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within a state. In international human rights covenants, in U.N. practice, and in state practice itself, sovereignty is now understood as embracing this dual responsibility. Sovereignty as responsibility has become the minimum content of good international citizenship.⁷¹

In contradiction to positivism and its reliance on power and the letter of the law, the international community agrees that sovereignty is as much about upholding human rights as it is about territorial control. As a result, others aspects of sovereignty, such as recognition by other states, should be conditional upon the state meeting certain humanitarian standards, which uphold the dignity of every person.

The Charter of the United Nations posited two conflicting principles of international relations: respect of state sovereignty and respect for human rights. Positivists such as John Austin only recognize the actions of the sovereign and enacted law and legal judgments as legitimate sources of law. The position of legal positivism holds that humanitarian intervention that is not authorized by the U.N. is necessarily illegal because it is contradictory to the positive international law of non-intervention as articulated in the U.N. Charter. Despite the popular reliance on the positivist viewpoint in regard to international law, there are a number of weaknesses with this position that indicate that positive law cannot be the sole source legitimate law. In fact, international law

⁷⁰ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: International Development Research Center for ICISS, 2001), <http://www.iciss.gc.ca/report-en.asp/>.

⁷¹ Ibid.

specifically recognizes legitimate sources of law that are not contained in positive law, such as general principles and international customs. Additionally, positivists do not adequately account for the inconsistent U.N. and state practice since the enactment of the Charter. States have resorted to intervention without U.N. authorization and have justified these actions with humanitarian concerns, and the U.N. has not condemned all of these unauthorized interventions; this is a clear contradiction of the positivist dependence on enacted law and legal judgments. Furthermore, supporters of legal positivism argue that Security Council decisions in response to threats of international peace are the only legal sources of intervention. However, the veto power held by members makes the Security Council largely incompetent and ineffective in the face of massive human rights violations.

Natural law theorists, such as Thomas Aquinas, attribute these weaknesses of the positivist argument to its inability and refusal to account for the values and principles held by the U.N. Charter, as well as international law in general. While adhering to universal principles derived from “right reason,” natural law can account for and address the conflicting principles of sovereignty and individual rights in international law. To the supporters of natural law, rules represent universal principles and values held by society. From this viewpoint, positive law must be interpreted and enacted in accordance with the moral purpose for which it exists; positive law must be subordinate to positive law. Advocates of the natural law perspective argue that humanitarian intervention, in the face of mass atrocities and the gross violation of human rights, can override the existing posited law that prohibits intervention absolutely. Since the enactment of the U.N. Charter, states continue to cite universal principles as legitimate sources of law to justify humanitarian intervention in certain circumstances.

Natural law accounts for and addresses the conflicting principles of the humanitarian intervention debate. This legal theory supports the primacy of universal principles, such as the respect of human dignity and fundamental human rights, over the principles found in the written letter of the law, such as the supreme rule of the sovereign and non-intervention under any circumstances. The natural law justification of humanitarian intervention was further developed and accepted by the international community with the publication of *The Responsibility to Protect*. This report, which was later adopted by the United Nations, challenges the traditional positivist

view of international law by asserting that it is an inherent duty of state sovereignty is to protect the safety and fundamental human rights of civilians. The international community adhered to the basic tenets of natural law when they agreed that the principle of respecting human rights was superior to the principle of respecting territorial control. This altered conception of sovereignty and increased emphasis on protection of individual rights, as adopted by the international community, justifies and legitimizes humanitarian intervention in the face of human rights abuses.

The center of this controversy between legal positivists and natural law theorists has primarily been the Charter of the United Nations. Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan addressed the debate of the legality and justification of humanitarian intervention directly in 2001.⁷² He eloquently called on the primacy of universal principles of the natural law tradition when he stressed that the U.N. Charter “was issued in the ‘name of the peoples,’ not the governments of the United Nations . . . The Charter protects the sovereignty of peoples. It was never meant as a license for governments to trample on human rights and human dignity. Sovereignty implies responsibility, not just power.”⁷³

⁷² Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 13.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

We: Relationality as the Basis for Human Fulfillment

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A hallmark of the contemporary age is an increasing consideration of the interconnectedness of the world, ranging from computer data networks to urban planning to environmental sustainability. The area of philosophical anthropology has also benefitted from this trend in its application to the human person. The present work will make use of the writings of W. Norris Clarke, a neo-Thomist who investigated the human person as fundamentally relational. By examining the relationality of the person, the concept of the I-Thou relationship comes to light as a deeper fulfillment of man's life through the reciprocal exchange of goodness, knowledge and the love that comprises it. However there is a deeper relationship—that of the *We*—in which human fulfillment reaches its apex through a more profound communion. This *We* is constituted by a mutual indwelling of persons which seeks to incorporate all others into their own communion of love. The will to achieve this type of communion is found in the structure of the person, but can only be found in short glimpses of his current existence.

Before applying his philosophical framework to the human person, Clarke begins by analyzing the metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas. One of the strata that provide the foundation for the rest of his work is the fact that being is intrinsically active. It would be misleading to say that first there is being, then there is acting. Rather, to be *is* to act. Every being that exists is in operation and aims to communicate itself to other beings. In this way beings find their

perfection not only by existing but by their outpouring of goodness to others. For living things this occurs by both interacting with other things around them, and by the capacity for self-replication. Clarke notes that for Aquinas, finite being communicates its goodness for two reasons: it is poor yet at the same time it is rich. It is poor in that it lacks the fullness of existence; hence it “strives to enrich itself as much as its nature allows from the richness of those around it.”¹ It is rich in that despite its finitude, it still has a real magnitude of goodness which it can communicate. Perhaps the dynamic communicativeness of being can be understood most simply by Clarke’s observation that if a being is *not* self-manifesting then it would be as if it did not exist; “practically speaking, it might just as well not be at all—it would in fact be indistinguishable from non-being.”²

So far a number of terms have been identified—acting, self-manifesting, communicating, outpouring. Each of these terms contains within it the idea there is some second thing involved: acting means acting *on* [*x*], communicating means communicating *to* [*x*]; by definition communicating needs something to communicate *to*. All of these terms can be subsumed under the idea of relationality. Thus it follows that insofar as being necessarily acts, self-manifests, and communicates, being is inherently relational; everything that exists is dyadic in nature. There is, however, a danger at this point in our analysis. Since the relationality of being seems so fundamental, it may seem tempting to claim that this is the very root of being. But although relationality stands at the epicenter of being, it must be founded on substance:

Relationality and substantiality go together as two distinct but inseparable modes of reality. Substance is the primary mode, in that all else, including relations, depend on it as their ground . . . *To be* fully is to be *substance-in-relation*.³

For a particular thing to relate to another, it itself must exist substantially, as a unity. Otherwise there would be nothing to relate.⁴

¹ W. Norris Clarke S.J., *Person and Being* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1993), 10.

² *Ibid.*, 13.

³ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁴ Clarke mentions the error of Buddhist thinking in this regard and also names several philosophers and their distorted ideas of substance: Descartes’ unrelated substance, Locke’s unknowable substratum, and Hume’s separable substance.

This will be important for the later application of this framework for the anthropological application, since the person is in effect annihilated unless it has a stable core of in-itselfness.

It should be made clear that much of the inspiration for this philosophical domain and the anthropological implications that will follow comes from the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. God—the pinnacle of being—exists as one perfect essence in three persons who eternally communicate to each other in an exchange of love. This will be especially crucial in the realm of receptivity as an active, perfecting quality of being, instead of a passive and deficient quality. Despite the causal link to Christian revelation, the philosophical development at hand can stand on its own and does not need to presuppose the existence of the Holy Trinity (although a case could be made that by now seeing the relational dimensions in human beings more clearly, they could be reasoned to exist in the ultimate being as well). This is the beauty of the unity of truth—that revelation opens “a new possibility in the nature and meaning of being that we might never have thought of ourselves from our limited human experiences,” which now spills over into all sorts of new avenues of thought, research, art, and life.

The person as self-communicative and receptive

In applying this metaphysic of relationality to the human person, many fascinating layers of this foundation could be explored. But in this analysis I will limit my investigation to two aspects of the person: his self-communicativeness and his receptivity. Previously it was shown that all being possesses two distinct but inseparable modes of acting: substantiality, which is the inward dimension of being—that which stands as a thing on its own—and relationality, which is the outward dimension whereby a substance interacts with other beings. This outward dimension contains its own inward/outward distinction. By self-communication the person acts relationally to another; the completion of the act is realized on the outside, so to speak. By receptivity the person receives from another, and the expression of the other is taken in and realized inside the receiver. These acts will be described further.

In self-communication the person essentially diffuses his own goodness to others around him. Because the person is self-possessed, which is not true of non-personal beings in nature, this diffusion is a free, conscious choice which is identical to the act of loving. From this Clarke states that being “an actualized human

person, then, is to be a *lover*, to live a life of inter-personal self-giving and receiving.”⁵ Clarke also quotes Norbert Hoffman, who links this idea back to the Divine Being, saying that love is the “primal” impulse and passion of being. But what exactly is communicated in this act of loving self-giving? Many things could be named, but of them the greatest are for Clarke wisdom and love. Wisdom includes the whole gamut of knowledge—practical knowledge, knowledge of familiarity, epistemic knowledge, and spiritual knowledge. Love also includes the entire range of different relationships: “the joy of togetherness both in shared action and simple loving co-presence or communion, and the creative expression of all this in the many ways appropriate to an embodied spirit.”⁶ Because of the great variety and degree of communicative interactions between human persons, a network, or web, of crisscrossing and overlapping bonds is formed. We call this “community,” and what follows is that all being, and particularly personal being, is ordered to communion. What is interesting about this communion is that the person’s individuality, personality, and self-possession are not lost in the midst of this communion. Rather they are strengthened in the very act of self-giving, for a person fulfills his very nature by his self-communication. In the measure that a person communicates his interior to others he becomes unique, distinct, and special; but if he remains in isolation and excludes himself from the communion with others then he is not noticed, his identity and individuality is not seen, and increasingly it seems as if he does not exist.

The flip side of outward self-communication is the inward dimension of receptivity. For a long time receptivity was seen as a deficiency in being, and therefore as a deficiency in the person. At first glance this seems reasonable; what is received was not possessed previously, therefore it is a change, a potential which has been actualized. In the non-personal world of things which is shaped indifferently by various forces, this deficiency makes sense, but for persons this metaphysical outlook is insufficient. If being is intrinsically self-communicative, then it must follow that there be some other being to receive what is given. Otherwise it would seem like personal beings were all speaking but no one was listening—or at least the act of listening would imply a privation. In a sense the change from a lack of my friend’s love to a fullness of it can be

⁵ *Ibid.*, 76.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 78.

considered a deficiency; however, Clarke notes that this is only a temporal deficiency, rather than a deficiency of nature.⁷ Receptivity is actually a positive perfection, whereby the person actively and freely chooses to receive the other. For the Trinity the temporal aspect is eliminated, such that even outside of time the Son eternally receives the love of the Father and communicates it in return; in the eternal exchange no form of passivity enters into the equation. Thus the immutability of God is preserved while highlighting the goodness of active receptivity. Clarke concludes that “self-communication and receptivity are two complementary and inseparable [and *equal*] sides of the dynamic process of being itself.”⁸ While this aspect of relationality is latent in the work of St. Thomas, it needed to be teased out by various philosophical approaches.

Beyond I–Thou: The indwelling of the We

The two modes of relationality described above are built into the I–Thou relationship that characterizes the work of Martin Buber, Gabriel Marcel, and other personalist contemporary philosophers. If to be human is to be in communion, then the other person must be addressed as Thou, rather than he, she or it. When a person uses second-person form of address “Thou,” he puts himself in an immediate encounter with the other. In doing this he allows himself to be encountered *as* Thou, as a human, and therefore he embraces his own humanity as well as that of the other. This stands against two major anthropological errors. On one extreme the radical individualism that was fostered in the eighteenth century through thinkers like Hobbes and Locke, who mistakenly overemphasized the aspect of personal self-communication. In this view, being fully human was a matter of a self-sufficiency and personal stability that necessarily competed with others. Social ties and contracts were necessary to maintain a kind of cautious peace, but in general man’s nature was seen in terms of strife, competition, and domination. Lying on the other extreme was a radical anti-individualism that eliminates the contents of man for the sake of a group structure such as the State (as in Marx). Here the problem of relationality without substance comes to the fore again; without the substance of the individual, the person has nothing to relate, and thus a society built from this method is devoid of actual humanity and is rather

⁷ *Ibid.*, 84.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 85.

controlled by the prevailing political and cultural forces, often violating human dignity in the process.

The structure of the I-Thou relationship allows each person to stand in himself, while freely remaining open to the other in all his or her otherness. Because being tends to embrace the other, I do not need to fear the loss of my self. But even in this interaction between I and Thou, there seems to be something more profound that can be drawn out. In “I-Thou” there is a distance, a space, a kind of residual remoteness at play. While holding firm the substantiality of persons, we could say that the I-Thou transforms itself at a deeper level into a “We.” Here the two persons, who, in a sense, faced each other, now turn with a unified gaze toward other persons. The intercommunication between them persists, but what is added is a fuller openness to reality. In ordinary experience we can point to examples that show how the idea of the We is deeper and truer than the level of I and Thou. Consider the example of a boyfriend and girlfriend who become infatuated with each other. Whenever they are together they gaze into each others’ eyes, they speak beautiful things in whispers, and it seems like their limbs are tangled around each other as tight as the Gordian knot. Their friends notice that they hardly spend time with them anymore, the couple begins to ignore their studies and obligations, and the lovers consider it an affront whenever someone asks for some of their time. We quickly can see that this relationship, despite the level of dyadic self-giving between the boy and girl, lacks a certain kind of maturity. Now compare this to a different couple who still set aside personal one-on-one time, yet face outward *together* as We. They continue to make time for their friends, they volunteer to work together at community events, and they consider interruptions and requests from others as opportunities to share the goodness of their relationship—perhaps even giving counsel on how to foster a loving relationship. In short, they are being *for others*.

The communion that this latter couple has is more mature and more fulfilling. It is not limited by just one other, but it seeks to commune with others outside of them, in a sense bringing them into the love they have. This can be seen in the dynamics of a healthy family in which the parents share an intense love, yet do not have to regard their children as competitors—as enemies—toward that love. But how is this possible, this We which insatiably draws beings together in itself? For lack of a more precise term, this communion can only occur through an in-dwelling of each person in the other.

What constitutes the We is the fact that persons not only communicate their goodness to each other in reciprocity, but also freely *hand over* their whole existence, their self-possession, to the beloved. The accompanying experience is that of living-in the other, and of being-lived-in; thus the I-Thou which has become We can open its doors to make room for even more Thous (thus expanding the We) because of the certainty of the union and presence with the original beloved.

Karol Wojtyła's play *The Jeweler's Shop* provides a concrete basis on which to found our analysis so far. Still living with her husband, but in a marriage that has become cold and distant, Anna says:

It was as if Stefan had ceased to be in me.
Did I cease to be in him too?
Or was it simply that I felt
I now existed only in myself?
At first I felt such a stranger
in myself!
It was as if I had become unaccustomed to the walls
of my interior—
so full had they been of Stefan
that without him they seemed empty.
Is it not too terrible a thing
to have committed the walls of my interior
to a single inhabitant
who could disinherit my self
and somehow deprive me of my place in it!⁹

And later:

Life changed
into a more and more strenuous existence of two
people
who occupied
less and less room in each other.
Only the sum of duties remained,
a sum total conventional and changing,
removed further and further away
from the pure taste of enthusiasm.
And so little, so little, joins together.¹⁰

⁹ Karol Wojtyła, *The Jeweler's Shop*, trans. Boleslaw Taborski (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), 48.

Anna's emptiness of heart, in which there is no room for the other, has a direct effect on her daughter Monica. She is set to marry her beloved Christopher, but feels the precariousness of human love, asking, "will you not leave as my father has, who is a stranger at home; shall I not leave like Mother, who has become a stranger? Is human love at all capable of enduring through man's whole existence?"¹¹ Her primary relationship was with her parents, who because of their paucity of love could not give Monica the inner personal stability with which to go outward. Consequently she finds it increasingly difficult to commit to Christopher—to dwell in his heart—since her mother failed to dwell in her and vice versa. Monica has no loving We to ground herself in. Interestingly, Christopher's mother, Teresa, lives out a converse but similarly painful situation as Anna. Teresa's husband was killed during combat, yet because of their real love as an outward-facing We, his presence somehow endures both in her and through their son:

Christopher does not know his father.

Our union remained in that child, nothing more.

Christopher grew up,

Andrew did not die in me, did not die on any front,

he did not even have to come back, for somehow
he is.

...

So I did not leave the sphere of your most strange
person, to whom I had given myself, from whom I
do not know how to withdraw.¹²

Through their intense in-dwelling, Teresa almost seems to overcome the barrier of death, confident that she is still united to Andrew, despite his physical absence. Their "We" almost seems to penetrate the substance of their being. A similar kind of oneness is found across the history of mystical experience, where separation and distance is surmounted by an intense communion between human person and the Absolute.

Josef Pieper's work can also help us to illuminate this "We." In his considerations about the nature of truth and its relation to man, Pieper writes that man is *capax universi*—able to grasp the

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 51.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 75.

¹² *Ibid.*, 72f.

universe, to comprehend all things.¹³ Man tirelessly seeks to know everything that is around him, and although the search is never finished completely, man as a spiritual substance “is all in all, insofar as [he] is able, through [his] cognitive power, to comprehend all there is.”¹⁴ He stands open before the world, taking into himself all of reality. In doing this, man participates in the *reditus* of God’s creation; the *exitus* of creation which came forth from God is gathered up in him and returned through his governance of lower creation, his knowledge, and his love. But man’s communion with the universe does not simply stop there; by virtue of his *personhood*, man also desires to draw all *persons* into himself through a union of love, and to be drawn into the We of others. Since he desires the infinite, he yearns to be caught up into the heights of personal being. This double *capax universi* and *capax omnis personae* shows that man’s end and fulfillment is in the participation of the dynamism of mutual indwelling of persons. Through their relationality all persons tend to participate in a great cosmic inhaling and exhaling; their mutual exchange of truth, goodness, and love corresponds to the inner structure of the human being.

At this point in our philosophical analysis it is difficult to resist drawing out the implications of the indwelling of the We in terms of Christology and theological anthropology. Let it suffice to mention a few words by Joseph Ratzinger on this topic. In an article with many connections to the thought of Clarke and the present essay, he writes that the notion of person has come to be seen in theology as constituted by relativity. In man’s journey toward God, Christ’s person becomes

the all-encompassing space in which the “we” of human beings gathers on the way to the Father . . . he is the integrating space in which the “we” of human beings gathers itself toward the “you” of God.¹⁵

He continues to comment that in Christianity, the “You” of God as Trinity is in fact also a “We”; Christ’s mission can be viewed in terms of the original in-dwelling of persons, who have been grafted into his mystical body, which is then taken up into the Trinitarian “We,”

¹³ Josef Pieper, *The Truth of All Things*, trans. Lothar Krauth (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 83.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, “Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology,” *Communio* 17 (1990): 439–54, 452f.

where the Divine persons dwell in each other.¹⁶ Ratzinger concludes through his primarily theological analysis the same point that Clarke makes in his primarily philosophical analysis—that the highest level of being is not only in singularity, as in the untouchable One of Plotinus. Rather unity and multiplicity are mutually supportive and have equal dignity.

Conclusion

To be is to be in communion. Using the metaphysics of Aquinas as the basis for an investigation of the person, W. Norris Clarke has steadily built up a philosophy of the human person as intrinsically relational. Two aspects we have investigated out of many possibilities were the human person's self-communication and his corresponding receptivity, which, far from being a deficiency, is actually a positive perfection. Therefore, humans are ontologically structured to turn toward each other in mutual exchanges of goodness. This openness and mutuality is expressed in the concept of the I-Thou relationship; yet even this intimacy points man toward a more profound level of existence: living as We—a communion so intense that it aims to embrace all of reality, even other persons within it, all the while still preserving the original individuality of its members. This development in thought has far-reaching applications, ranging from theology and anthropology to marriage counseling and child development, some of which have already taken root.

Is such an existence possible in this life? It is certainly difficult, and sometimes it appears impossible. We can, however, see faint traces of this communion prefigured most powerfully in loving relationships of marriage, family, and friendship. When most perfected, these relationships, which tend toward an indwelling of persons in each other as a We, seem to possess a sort of missionary dimension: stemming from their own communion, these persons are impelled to draw others into their community of love. The fulfillment of man's heart, his final end, then becomes an all-encompassing communion with all other humans, with all of creation, and with God.

¹⁶ See John 17:20: "That they may all be one, as you, Father, are in me and I in you, that they also may be in us."

